



The New History

theory into practice

P. J. Rogers

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Queen's University,
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Pleas for the 'New History' have by now become so commonplace that, if implementation had in any way matched recommendation, the term 'New' would have ceased to be appropriate. Unfortunately, the term appears to be little agreement as to what the 'New' History is or should be. In what sense, if any, can pupils become 'mini-historians' and at what age or ability level? What does this mean - in what activities would the children have to engage to fulfil this programme? Why is it desirable? Is it? That these and other questions remain unresolved is due (it is suggested) to the failure to provide an adequate answer to the fundamental epistemological question - namely, "What is historical knowledge?" It is only in terms of an answer to this question (if at all) that the concept 'New History' can be clarified. By no means should this be taken to mean either that psychological considerations are to be neglected, or that one, and only one, body of historical content is held to be required for universal study. The second point is shown to be erroneous by the very analysis of History which is made, and more than half of this pamphlet is devoted to the consideration of how the approach justified by analysis may (perhaps) be implemented. But it is contended that the epistemological question is fundamental in the sense of being the first to be answered.

The overall plan is as follows. First, the nature of History is developed from a brief discussion of the general conditions which validate a claim to knowledge, and the results of this analysis are applied in more detail to History. The nature of historical knowledge being thus sketched, the general implications of the analysis for teaching are set out. Clearly the analysis raises important pedagogical problems, and there follows a long discussion of method and of the practicalities of basing teaching upon the analysis of History. This is mounted in terms of the fruitful theories of J.S. Bruner, and of a critique of some other recent writings on History teaching. The work then moves to the description of two specimen courses, mounted in terms of the criteria which, according to the foregoing analysis, a History course should satisfy.

1. The conditions of knowledge

When, as often happens, the truth of a statement which we believe to be irrefutable is in fact questioned, we are forced to consider the grounds upon which our claims to knowledge rest - to consider, in other words, what it is to know something. In reply, one or both of two arguments would commonly be offered: that we 'know' x because we have it on good authority, or that on some other ground we feel absolutely sure that x is the case. But these replies have only to be stated for their inadequacy, both singly and in combination, to be obvious. In fact they merely restate the question. What makes an authority 'good' (or 'good enough') to be relied upon? Given that I 'feel sure', do I feel sure for good and sufficient reasons - have I the right to be sure? In educational terms, the pupil may feel quite sure that Sir Thomas More was hanged for heresy, and he may 'know' some proposition because he read it in his text book, or because his teacher told him that it is so; but this merely shows that he can feel sure and yet be wrong, and does not establish that teacher (or text book) may not be mistaken. For, of course, the question then becomes "How does teacher know?" and if the reply is made that, when he was a student, teacher's professor told him, the question is "How does the professor know?" If the futility of infinite regression is to be avoided some grounds for claims to knowledge other than mere authority must be found. As the matter stands no criterion has yet been indicated which will guarantee the truth of what the pupil claims to know. The crucial question which arises is where (or whether) such a guarantee can be found - or, rather, what would count as such a guarantee. Worded in this way the question becomes simply, "What is Truth?"

A common and crippling mistake is, in reply to this question, to identify 'Truth' with 'Certainty' and to define the latter term in the ultra-rigorous sense of 'final, and immune from error'. While such a criterion could (stipulatively) be employed, it seems hopelessly destructive. A hundred years ago nothing looked more comprehensive as an explanatory system - more 'certainly true' - than classical mechanics. The collapse of confidence in the early years of this century means neither that pre-Einsteinian Physics was entirely false nor that modern Physics deals in certainties - indeed, the 'Uncertainty Principle' is one of its corner-stones. Acceptance of 'certainty' as the criterion for knowledge claims would thus force us to deny the existence of scientific knowledge; and a criterion which entails absurd conclusions must itself be faulty.

While the concept of 'certainty' is unsatisfactory yet its very deficiency offers the solution to the problem of knowledge. For it is ambiguous. 'Certain' has a 'strong' and a 'weak' sense. A proposition can be 'certain' in the sense of 'necessarily true' - i.e. that in no state of the universe could it fail to hold; or it can mean 'so well attested by observation and experience as to be, for all practical purposes, certain'. It must be apparent that the

first definition is much more restrictive than the second, for it would confine knowledge to very limited categories of 'truths' - the axioms of formal logic, tautologies and pure mathematics - almost exhaust the list. Certainly such areas, or forms, of knowledge exist, but far more interesting for the present purpose is the second definition: for the concept of 'well attested by observation and experience' introduces the key notion of evidence for (or against) a belief.

The nature of evidence can best be elucidated by consideration of actual instances. Consider these four knowledge claims:

1. I know that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides.
2. I know that these ruins in front of me are those of a Roman villa.
3. I know that God exists.
4. I know that this substance is sulphur.

If we take these four knowledge claims and consider what would count as evidence for (or against) each one it becomes obvious not merely that different things will be relevant in each case but that the procedures of enquiry - the strategies by which the different 'things' are appropriately to be marshalled and deployed in order to make enquiry effective - will also differ. For the first, example, the notion of evidence is not appropriate. It is, rather, a question of strict deductive argument from assumed premises to which observation and experiment are hardly relevant. It is, in fact, an instance of the 'strong certainty' knowledge distinguished above. By contrast, observation, hypothesis formation, and relevant background knowledge which is itself empirically based, are crucial to the second and fourth questions; but just what is to be observed, how the (very different) hypotheses which the two will respectively generate are to be tested, and the nature of the relevant enabling knowledge are quite different in the two cases. Again, the third question involves yet different criteria. One which is possibly admissible might be personal revelation - which none of the others would countenance for a moment - and so on.

The upshot is that evidence is by no means all of a piece. Not only are different things 'evidence' for different kinds of enquiry, but different ways of handling them are necessary. There is no way in which, for example, historical documents, and the sort of scrutiny to which historians subject them, could be the means of carrying on scientific enquiry. So it would appear that there are different kinds, or 'forms', of knowledge which coalesce around different areas of experience. Each of these forms of knowledge is concerned to produce a particular kind of statement based upon, and validated by, a related concept of evidence deployed through particular procedural criteria which have been developed and shaped in the light of what experience shows to be effective. In short a knowledge area gains its coherence from its propositional character or its 'know that', and its procedural character or 'know how'.

Both these distinctive features of a form or type of knowledge are

equally important. To 'know' something on good authority means that the proposition which one 'knows' is the outcome of an enquiry which satisfies the appropriate procedural criteria - which criteria are identified by the nature of evidence available; only 'know how' can give 'the right to be sure' because it is the only valid basis for claims to 'know that'. On the other hand, 'know how' is no general technique of enquiry, but is marked by a large element specific to the sort of area of enquiry and hence type of proposition which it has been shaped to serve. There are different kinds of evidence which have to be deployed and manipulated by different enquiry strategies.

It is important that this second point should not be overlooked. The foregoing argument must not be taken as regarding 'know that' as of no importance; on the contrary its production is the point of the whole exercise. While it is true that 'know that' is derivative from 'know how' in the sense that only the latter can provide valid grounds for the former, the relationship holds equally in reverse; for the nature of a particular 'know how' (say historical) derives from the sort of proposition with which History is concerned. It would be inapplicable and inappropriate to any other sort of enquiry - say, a scientific or a mathematical one. The relationship between 'know that' and 'know how' is in no sense antithetical but symbiotic; the two can indeed be separated only for analysis and in order to correct the grave imbalance caused by undue stress on mere propositions typical of so much teaching - and of many subjects apart from History. Such 'mere propositions' cannot really count as knowledge but at best as information. Propositional knowledge, is suggested, must be seen to be the outcome, and must at least occasionally demonstrate the validity, of the procedures of enquiry which justify it by their appropriateness and relevance - which qualities themselves derive from the type of proposition concerned. There are different kinds of evidence which have to be deployed and manipulated by different enquiry strategies precisely because there are different kinds of question concerned to produce different kinds of statement.

Each area of knowledge is thus marked by distinctive features. So far the propositional and procedural characteristics - the 'know that' and 'know how' - have been indicated. The third distinguishing feature is conceptual. All coherent bodies of knowledge deal in concepts, and this conceptual character belongs, it is suggested, to the 'know that' and to the 'know how'. Concepts are both part of the content we must come to learn - we have to internalise 'mass', 'force', and 'energy' if we are to learn Physics - and among the important means by which enquiry is focused and carried on - one's conceptual frame determines the very questions one asks and, indeed, affects even those one can conceive of. In short, concepts have to be used as well as merely understood - in fact, as will be argued shortly, it is doubtful whether any claim to understanding a concept could be justified if it did not rest upon considerable and varied practice.

The general implications for teaching would seem to be as follows: First, if it is true that knowledge is of different types then it follows that the distinguishing feature of a form or type of knowledge must characterise the teaching. To teach science is to teach Science - what science is; a first task is to map the distinctive

features of whatever body of knowledge we are concerned to teach.

It should be clear that no adequate teaching can be purely (or perhaps even mainly) 'know that' in character. Not only is its 'know how' a distinctive feature of a form of knowledge; since it is the means by which the propositions of that form are generated, and is the only thing which gives the right to be sure about them it must, surely, be accorded at least equal importance in the educational process. This is not to say that the whole learning enterprise must be based on experiment and discovery or that a great deal of learning will not be taken more or less directly from the teacher. It means that the justification for doing so is an important part of what the pupils have to learn. The teacher is not just in authority, but an authority, and it is the latter fact which entitles him to a respectful hearing. It would seem to follow that the criteria which determine authoritativeness - which, are of course, the intrinsic procedural criteria whose satisfaction gives "the right to be sure" - must figure importantly in the pupils' education if their reliance upon the teacher is to have a really rational foundation. This is not of course to hold that the rationale of any enquiry can always be internalised by the pupils. Obviously enquiries differ in procedural complexity according to the content with which they deal, and the valuable pedagogic hint which the principle contains is that one criterion for 'what to teach' is that content studied should be, as often as possible, at a level where its justification and rationale may be accessible to the pupils.

The case is strengthened when the third feature of a form of knowledge, its conceptual character, is considered. For when what is involved in mastering a concept is grasped the inadequacy of mere 'know that' becomes clear. Knowing a concept involves far more than learning a definition. If mere arid verbalism is to be avoided the concept must not only be variously (and, by inference, frequently) encountered in different contexts (although that is necessary); it must be used by the learner. For understanding a concept must involve the ability not merely to recognise instances of its correct use but correctly to employ it oneself, and to draw out its implications, in novel situations to which it is in fact seen to apply. There is no way in which mere instruction can encompass this objective; and if it is not achieved, the concept is not really learned.

It is, moreover, the 'know how-ful' teaching and learning which can indicate a meaning and use for the modern insistence on 'activity' learning. The trouble with 'activity' as it commonly features in educational literature is its quite unhelpful vagueness and generality. Primary Education in Scotland, for example, defines it as follows:

"Activity, however, should not be taken to imply that the child should always be physically active, always bustling about, always 'doing', always manipulating; thought itself is activity and in this sense the child may be most active at times when he is perfectly still and quiet." (p.60)

The boy sitting quietly listening to the teacher's exposition of (say) some mathematical principle might, apparently, be as 'active' as the boy doing carpentry or even playing football. But if this

is so, 'activity' fails to pick out particular patterns of behaviour as desirable, because it is so compatible with any form of behaviour whatever. As it stands, 'Activity' is a mere slogan.

It is 'know how' that can turn it into a useful concept. For what is lacking in the slogan is any indication of appropriate activity, and this is just what the analysis of the distinctive features of a form of knowledge, and its use as the groundwork of teaching and learning, can provide. In what sorts of 'activity' should students of (say) science engage? - In sorts which are actually typical of the procedural character of science - or, at least, which are believed, on reasonable and informed grounds, to contribute to the mastery of concept or content.

But not only does 'know how' articulate 'Activity'; the link, once made, is useful in the reverse direction: for it ensures that the conditions for successful 'know how-ful' teaching and learning are met. The point is that learning 'know how' is much more than learning a repertoire of stereotyped routines. It is the internalising of principles of procedure, and their varying embodiment in an indefinite number of actual enquiries which is at stake. No two scientific enquiries (for example) will be identical; but since all must variously satisfy the same (or, at least, some of the same) general criteria of which they each supply a unique assemblage, it follows that there can be no substitute for frequent practice in constructing appropriate strategies for actual enquiries. For what counts as 'knowing' the criteria is knowing how adaptively to embody them in practice, just as 'knowing' how to play chess well means the ability to produce, one after another, an endless permutation of moves, all differentially embodying the rules of the game and all tending towards winning it.

2. Historical knowledge

The upshot of this discussion for the teaching of History would seem to be that its distinctive features must be mapped in some detail. What are the propositions, procedures and concepts with which History is concerned?

The first point to be made is that while all forms of knowledge possess this threefold character, yet they differ in the degree to which they are conceptually esoteric. In Physics, for example, terms like 'wave' and 'particle' have meanings far deeper and more precise than they possess in everyday speech. Moreover they cannot but characterise, sooner or later, any course which is to count as Physics at all. By contrast, History is conceptually non-esoteric. It does not contain extensive networks of concepts having little or no application outside itself, which must characterise any study of it. Unlike Physics, History is continuous with, not distinct from, general human experience, and we shall therefore find that there is continuity between the concepts met in historical enquiry and those encountered in general experience, and we shall find also that the concepts employed are determined by the choice of a subject to study.

If, for example, the subject is international relations in the 19th

century, then the 'balance of power', the 'national interest', 'imperialism', etc, will be met with. If one is concerned with the history of Art, then 'beauty', 'form', 'gothic', 'baroque', will be the sort of terms one will encounter. If one studies Ancient Greece, one will meet with, and need to understand, some concepts which one does not meet with or need to understand if one studies the history of modern Europe. On the other hand, if one studies the politics and foreign policy of both periods, one will need, and meet, many of the same concepts. Historical concepts are thus really the concepts of politics or art or science or economics, according to what one is studying. It must be stressed, however, that these activities are not fully independent one of another. They interlock and interact continually, and the historical explanation will be concerned to bring out those relations as part of the accurate record of change which it is concerned to give.

The propositional character of History is more distinctive than the conceptual. Its essence is narrative. History tells stories - but stories which seek to make intelligible the truth about events which have actually occurred. This is the great distinction, of course, between a historical narrative and a work of literature - especially a novel - to which it bears a superficial resemblance. Whereas the novelist is constrained by nothing except the requirements of internal consistency and a general sense of what is probable, the historian must work with the ambiguous records of a mass of events intractably given by a past which has irretrievably taken place.

The crucial importance of this seemingly platitudinous point is that it necessarily makes the historian's work explanatory, and selective in order that it may explain. In his amusing and penetrating exposition of this point, Danto invents an imaginary 'Ideal Chronicler' who

"Knows whatever happens the moment it happens, even in other minds. He is also to have the gift of instantaneous transcription: everything that happens across the whole forward rim of the Past is set down by him, as it happens, the way it happens. The resultant running account I shall term the Ideal Chronicle (hereafter referred to as I.C.). Once event E is safely in the past, its full description is in the I.C." (Danto, 1965, p.149)

Danto points out that the first impression created by the existence of this Chronicle - that the historian's role is now redundant - is false. For while it is true that he can (by definition) never improve on, or (in practice) even match, the comprehensiveness of the Ideal Chronicle's facts, "the Ideal Chronicle will not tell him everything he wants to know". For even the Ideal Chronicle can relate only events that were witnessed; and a great part of an event - namely, its consequences - cannot be witnessed because at the time the event exists to be witnessed they lie in the future, and cannot (at this time) be known. They become known later to the historian by means of his hindsight, which enables him to probe the full significance of an event from his vantage point long after its occurrence.

But it is not only true that the consequences or significance of an event cannot be observed, but must be exposed by the historian's hindsight; not all events have significance and, consequently, the historian's task necessarily includes selection. Some facts would

not enter into any historical narrative, not because the historian is ignorant of them, but because they do not interest him. There was nothing at all unusual in medieval scholars publishing controversial theses to provoke learned debate, and many unquestionably did so; but only one such publication is of major interest to historians - that at Wittenberg on October 31 1517, and the interest arises from the consequences which ultimately flowed from Luther's step and made it momentous.⁽¹⁾ Again, history books place enormous stress on the Spanish Armada of 1588; they pay a certain amount of attention to the Spanish landing at Kinsale in 1601; and they pay very little indeed to the further Spanish expeditions of 1596 and 1597. The reason is obvious. 1588 was a crisis year. England, and perhaps the Reformation, were in mortal danger, Spain on the brink of a great triumph if not final victory in her European designs; the outcome contributed ultimately to the salvation of the one and to the discomfiture of the other. 1601 posed a grave threat to England, and Mountjoy's victory, by removing it, added reinforcement to the result of 1588; 1596 and 1597 amounted to nothing because the "armadas" were scattered by storm in the Bay of Biscay. The interest of historians in these events is directly proportionate to their consequences and significance.

It is this need for selection which makes a historical account necessarily explanatory. For selection requires criteria whose point of reference is intelligibility, and which consequently relate intimately to explanation. Suppose the year 1832 was the subject of a historical narrative. The events reported by the historian would, very likely, vary markedly according to whether he was primarily concerned with Franchise Reform or Public Health or other matters, and the reason for the difference is, of course, that he is concerned that his account shall make clear the chosen topic by putting in only those facts and relationships which, with his hindsight, he can see to have been significant for the topic. In short, his account, being selective, is explanatory.

This argument is strengthened rather than weakened (as might perhaps seem at first sight) if a general survey including all (or many) of the topics for 1832 were the subject of the narrative. For while, in that case, the sheer number of facts would be larger, it is only in this trivial sense that selection would be less operative. If a mere indiscriminating heap of facts is to be avoided their sheer number would require even more stringently that their complex relationships should be brought out and interwoven in the narrative, the texture of which would thus be even more explicitly explanatory than when only one topic is pursued.

The facts selected should, thus, be connected in two ways - each with its consequences, and each with every other fact selected (because of their common relevance to what it is the historian is writing about). Such a selective principle must result in an explanatory narrative - in fact, valid criticism of it would largely consist of demonstration that the connections claimed were faulty, or that it ignored facts which had as good a claim to inclusion on the ground of their connections as some of those included - in short, that its explanation was faulty or incomplete. The point is that History is a record of change through time, and such a record cannot but select facts which were fertile with future consequences because they and their consequences are the change(s) which are to be recorded.

Constructing an historical narrative is thus a process of winnowing, of differentiation between the various members of a mass of crude facts and of showing their intrinsic relations. In a word, historical narrative is the product of colligation - of "explaining an event by tracing its intrinsic relations with other events and locating it in its historic context". (Walsh, 1965, p.59)

There are certain dangers in colligation, one of which is especially relevant here. Exactly because the historian's account is to be explanatory there is a risk that he may impose an over-tyd and precise pattern upon a reality which was in fact shot through with doubt and uncertainty - that statesmen, for example, may appear to be almost entirely rational in their calculations. The remedy is, however, indicated by the very wording of Walsh's last phrase with its stress upon context. The danger is avoided by the nature of History, which is fundamentally a 'reconstruction' of a past which has vanished apart from the traces of it which fortuitously remain; and the categorisation of History (which will provide a teaching model and, amongst other things, a safeguard against the danger just described) is largely a matter of identifying the components of reconstruction.

The first of these is, obviously, evidence in the direct sense of particulars ascertained from sources, usually, but not necessarily, documentary. (This is henceforth referred to as 'particular evidence'.) But much more often than not much of the significance of a particular fact is latent - it has, in short, to be interpreted and, for this, context is of overriding importance. Whether or not Parnell spoke certain words on a particular occasion is not (usually) what is in dispute; what may be debated is their significance and this cannot be estimated (except by a most naive enquirer) until the context of his remarks is known - to whom was he speaking, on what occasion, against what background? - and so on. In short, to understand a remark or action in the past a fairly detailed knowledge of past circumstances is likely to be pre-requisite. Obviously, this involves the knowing of many other 'facts', but even if our knowledge of background in this sense were compendious interpretation might still not be automatic. The very important reason for this may be that the texture and climate of the society under study may be more or less different from our own, and to understand a fact it has not only to be set in its context of other relevant facts, but viewed in terms of the norms and assumptions typical of its time. All too often the past is judged by present standards of appropriateness and rectitude, and the possibility of reconstructing the past as it was - of understanding it - is lost. From now on the present work refers to such enabling background knowledge whether of other facts or of assumptions and norms as 'contextual frame of reference'.

But context is intimately connected with a third element of reconstruction - indeed, so close is the connection that the new component is almost an aspect of context. To understand the behaviour of an historical character it is necessary not just to understand, with hindsight, the objective conditions in which he was placed (insofar as these can be known) but how those conditions were perceived by him. In a word, 'empathy' is a vital part of the reconstructive enterprise - to identify with the character under study not only in the contextual senses already distinguished but

in the personal sense of seeing things as Cromwell or Nelson or Hitler did. Obviously the two are very closely related, and the close relation may be compounded by linking both context and empathy to particular evidence. For of course both contextual frame and the possibility of empathising presuppose adequate (and, by implication, ample) particular knowledge. Reconstruction is thus a highly integrated operation whose components are probably inseparable in practice. (A detailed practical example is given below - see pp.43-46)

But while this may be the process by which historical narratives are constructed, what of their validity? If the process is sound how is it that what purports to be an explanatory true story of some section of the past evokes heated controversy amongst equally well informed specialists? What is really at stake is the possibility of historical knowledge, and that possibility exists because of the nature of History as an open enquiry into matters which are often essentially contested. If, therefore, there were no disagreements among historians there would be no way in which the monolithic group decisions (as the propositions of History would then become) could be checked. They would be insulated from scrutiny and would degenerate into dogma. The point of procedural criteria is not that they produce universally agreed versions of the past but they provide the means by which disagreement may reasonably be carried on. For they impose rigorous standards which a historical narrative must meet, or be laughed out of court. Dispute and discussion are the mainspring of developing knowledge. (2) J.H. Hexter gives an amusing and trenchant account of the position:

"The serried array of historical trade journals equipped with extensive book-review columns provides the most powerful external sanction. The columns are often at the disposal of cantankerous cranks ever ready to expose to obloquy 'pamphleteers' who think that Clio is an 'easy-bought mistress bound to suit her ways to the intellectual appetites of the current customer'. On more than one occasion I have been a cantankerous crank. When I write about the period between 1450 and 1650 I am well aware of a desire to give unto others no occasion to do unto me as I have done unto some of them." (Hexter, 1961, p.8)

The discussion of historical narratives has thus brought out the fundamental importance of procedures, including open enquiry, and of the sources. Procedures will be dealt with below. For the moment the epistemological requirement that pupils studying History must experience source work is to be made explicit.

Firstly the nature of an historical narrative shows that any view of a scholarly work as merely giving information in any finalised sense is naive to the point of simple-mindedness. History often deals with matters that are essentially contested, and one function of scholarly work, and the criticism it attracts, is tacitly to show and develop the criteria of what constitutes valid historical activity - and, indeed, of what is to count as an historical question. It is by reading scholarly works, and by listening to (and perhaps joining in) the debates they arouse, that we often gain a sharp focus on the assumptions and criteria appropriate to the historical enterprise. What is at stake is, of course, partly the development of the relevant contextual frames of reference; but

fundamentally it concerns the criteria for valid use of sources, for it is from these that the frames are constructed.

There is, however, a crucial limitation to this argument when applied to teaching. For it is only genuine works of scholarship which can, for the most part, fulfil this role, and such works are quite inaccessible to any but the small minority of most able and most mature pupils. On the other hand, the major criticism to be made of school 'text' books is precisely their failure to fulfil the criterial role played by the scholarly work. It might seem at first sight that the criticism of them which this failure can evoke would be a valuable way of learning the criteria; but of course to make that criticism presupposes a provisional knowledge of what the criteria are - which the pupils, by definition, have not got. Since they cannot use genuine historical works, and since "text" books do not accomplish the historical task, there is no alternative for the pupils (given the need for criterial insight imposed by the 'essentially contested' nature of History) but to engage in work with the sources themselves.

It is doubtful, in any event, whether the study of scholarly works even by the small minority of pupils able to undertake it could, alone, be a reliable or adequate means of gaining the appropriate criterial insight. Except for fellow professionals, the skill with which the narrative is constructed may sometimes obscure the means by which it is done - so that the finished product may hide rather than teach the criteria which it embodies. While the contention cannot, perhaps, be proved, it seems certain that the ability to appraise the construction of a scholarly work will be intimately connected with experience in the appropriate constructive effort oneself - that is, in the handling of sources.

This line of reflection leads straight to the consideration of the third feature of historical knowledge, the procedural. A very brief preliminary statement will be made here, based upon the accounts of two eminent modern historians, of what is involved in historical enquiry, and how, in general, children may be able to engage in it. A fuller discussion of the procedures, and how children may in some sense experience them, is postponed until a relevant theory of instruction has been discussed.

In The Practice of History, G.R. Elton maintains, as a fundamental principle, that:

1. "Historical research does not consist, as beginners in particular often suppose, in the pursuit of some particular evidence which will answer a particular question ...

The historian must make one initial choice, of main area of study ... But after that ... he will, or should, ask no specific questions" (of his evidence) "until he has absorbed what it says ... (His) mind will indeed soon react with questions, but these are the questions suggested by the evidence" (and not by some pragmatic or propagandist purpose extrinsic to it) ... "After this initial stage the questions arising will be pursued specifically ... now the historian specifically seeks evidence to answer his questions." (p.84)

Elton's work concludes with a sharp attack upon the second account relied upon here - E.H. Carr's What is History? A full treatment of the dispute is clearly beyond the scope of the present work; but the educational significance, presently to be explained, of the apparent clash between their respective views of how evidence is to be handled makes these points worth taking up.

Elton argues, firstly, that the evidence must not be approached with questions extrinsic to it, or rummaged for answers, but allowed to suggest the questions which further evidence may be selected to answer, and, second, that research must consist of "a ... review of everything that may conceivably be germane to a given investigation" (Elton, p.88). Carr on the other hand describes the enterprise as follows:

"The facts are really not at all like fish on the fishmonger's slab. They are like fish swimming about in a vast and sometimes inaccessible ocean, and what the historian catches will depend, partly on chance, but mainly on what part of the ocean he chooses to fish in and what tackle he chooses to use - these two factors being, of course, determined by the kind of fish he wants to catch. By and large the historian will get the kind of facts he wants."(3)

This seems to put a different emphasis on the matter to Elton's, as does Carr's description (p.28) of writing the narrative.

"For myself, as soon as I have got going on a few of what I take to be the capital sources, the itch becomes too strong and I begin to write - not necessarily at the beginning, but somewhere, anywhere. Thereafter, reading and writing go on simultaneously. The writing is added to, subtracted from, reshaped, cancelled, as I go on reading. The reading is guided and directed and made fruitful by the writing: the more I write, the more I know what I am looking for, the better I understand the significance and relevance of what I find. I am convinced that, for any historian worth the name, the two processes of what economists call 'input' and 'output' go on simultaneously and are, in practice, parts of a single process."

This may imply a somewhat more 'interventionist' role for the historian than does Elton's account. In particular, it seems to provide for rather more latitude in approaching the sources with questions rather than having to derive all questions from the sources.

The educational importance of the dispute is that, taken together, the two views indicate how children may be introduced to, and have continuing experience of, source-based work. For while it may be impossible, as Carr implies (p.24) for the historian, as a creature of his own time, to approach his facts completely devoid of questions which do not arise from them (as Elton seems to require) children can sometimes do so precisely because of the lack of relevant bias and expectation which (Carr asserts) inhibits the professional historian. Their saving ignorance makes children capable of attempting Elton's programme, provided of course that they are confronted with materials which interest them. And, similarly, Carr's insistence that evidence cannot but be, in some degree,

selective, indicates, as this work argues below, that the admitted need for sources to be pre-selected for children by no means establishes (as it is often claimed) that therefore source-based enquiry is, for children, a fraud or a pretence, for all evidence is selected anyway. The question, of course, is the criteria upon which selection is made, whether for children or by the historian.

In fact, taken in tandem (so to speak) the Elton and the Carr specifications indicate how children may first be introduced to source-based work and then how the work may continue. Children can, in the first instance, approach sources in something of the way that Elton requires. As the sources themselves suggest questions and sometimes the means of answering them, so the maturing pupil, with his procedural skills ripening and his contextual frames developing with the continuing experience, may come to put, more and more often, questions which are more and more apt, combined in assemblages more and more skilfully adapted to an overall objective which may, perhaps, become genuinely historical. And this process slides insensibly into the Carr formula in that the questions come to include a larger and larger number which originate not in the actual sources the pupil has in front of him but from his deepening sense of fitness - from his maturing frames of appropriateness and probability.

A word must be added about "the sources". So far the tacit implication has been that these are necessarily written. But of course this is not so. A 'source' is anything which survives from the past and can be used, directly or indirectly, to reconstruct some part of it. 'Trace' is a better term than 'source' because of the documentary implications of the latter term; especially in teaching children pictures and artefacts are not only, very often, much more vivid and gripping than documents, but most valuable in mitigating the problem of the poor (or non-) reader. How far, and by what means, these other 'sources' can adequately deputise, so to speak, for written materials is discussed below. (pp.21, 44, 65, 66, 70-3) For the moment, the warranted stress on the existence of grounds for knowledge other than verbal leads naturally into the theory of instruction believed to be the most effective for implementing the proposal that children should engage in 'source'-based work. This theory is discussed in the next section.

1. Bruner

The brief discussion of the key features of historical knowledge - conceptual, propositional and procedural - leads directly into Bruner's theory of instruction. It has already carried out the first of the tasks which, he insists, are essential to the teaching of any subject. Everything meaningful is structured, in that it is no mere agglomeration, but a complex network of interlocking conceptual, propositional and procedural components which Bruner summarises as 'basic ideas'. It is these 'basic ideas' (which make up the 'structures') that should be the main content of the curriculum.

But while conveniently brief, the label 'basic ideas' is somewhat general. The important point is to establish what key ideas are. When Bruner (1960, p.31) goes on to argue that "the curriculum of a subject should be determined by the most fundamental understanding that can be achieved of the underlying principles that give structure to that subject", and that this cannot be done "without the active participation of the ablest scholars and scientists", he is clearly indicating the primary need for detailed epistemological analysis of whatever subject is in question so that its essential features may be exposed and made the basis of what is to be learned.

Once established, the basic ideas are to be progressively communicated to the pupils by means of the 'spiral' curriculum, which turns back on itself at higher levels and by which "any subject can be taught effectively in some intellectually honest form to any child at any stage of development" (1960, p.13, see also pp.52-9). A key idea can be encountered in examples of greatly varying difficulty, and education is a matter of arranging a graded sequence of representations such that, by moving from the simplest and most concrete representations of a key idea to the more and more complex, comprehensive, and abstract, the pupil may eventually acquire a comprehensive understanding of the idea itself.

The movement towards abstraction and comprehensiveness is matched in the third main component of Bruner's theory - the modes of representation, enactive, ikonic and symbolic. By these he means representation by a pattern of physical movement, by a visual image, or by some set of conventional symbols. "We can talk of three ways in which somebody 'knows' something - through doing it, through a picture or image of it, and through some such symbolic means as language." (Bruner, 1966, p.6)

At first sight Bruner seems to view these models as age-tied. "At each stage of development the child has a characteristic way of viewing the world and explaining it to himself. The task of teaching a subject to a child at any particular age is one of representing the structure of that subject in terms of the child's way of viewing things ... The task can be thought of as one of translation." (Bruner, 1960, p.33) However, his discussion of this issue makes it clear that the modes interlock and interact, and in one place he insists that they are interdependent. In an experiment

where quadratic functions were to be taught to eight-year-olds, not only were enactive, ikonic and, finally, symbolic, representations of the principles involved, but the two earlier modes were found to be essential props to the development of example-free abstract understanding. (Bruner & Kenney, 1965)

The relationship between the three modes of representation needs to be spelled out rather more fully. Bruner's reference to "translation" is especially helpful since it shows, tacitly, what is required of each mode, especially of ikonic and enactive. The essential point is that a visual or kinaesthetic representation of anything must "carry the message" to be transmitted. A picture, for example, which in no way contributes to the understanding and reconstruction of a past to which it relates but merely illustrates the text without adding anything to it is not an ikon at all, but a mere cosmetic embellishment. Unfortunately many 'visual aids' fall into this latter category. An attempt at genuine ikonic representation is offered below, where a picture of a soldier, known to be authentic, is not merely rummaged for details ("he wore this and that items of armour and carried these and those weapons") but set as a whole in its context (also visually created) so that its significance and implications for the course of events are brought out. (4)

Much of this work is concerned to apply Bruner's theory of instruction to the teaching of History - History as specified in the analysis above. First, a critique of four main current approaches to History teaching is attempted. These are used to show how epistemological analysis of a subject may be used to deploy effective - indeed, sometimes decisive - arguments for or against practical teaching schemes.

2. Approaches to History teaching

The approaches singled out for discussion are the 'patch' approach, lines of development, 'free enquiry' and what (for want of a better title) may be called the orthodox chronological approach. This last is taken first.

The work of Martin Booth has shown that whatever teachers may say or believe they are doing in teaching History - such as, for example, promoting "the beginnings of social insight" (Booth, 1969, p.59), the pupils' perceptions of what occurs are often more closely related to the conventional chronological approach than to any other.

As one of them remarks (Booth, p.63), "Well, there is" (too much rote learning) ... "but then how else can you do it? There isn't much else except learning facts and dates and things ... I mean, the only way you can learn about past things is to learn it all off parrot fashion". Essentially, this approach assumes, albeit uneasily in some cases (Booth, p.17), that what is of fundamental importance is the effective communication of that information which is viewed as the fruit of scholarship. The fallacy of this argument should have been established by the foregoing discussion (see pp.5-7). Firstly such communication cannot rank as knowledge, since the student, though he may be sure of what he has learned, has not the

right to be sure, even if what he has learned is in fact correct, for he cannot assess the grounds upon which the 'knowledge' rests. In other words the argument ignores the crucial interdependence of 'know that' and 'know how' by a gross under-representation of the latter. There can be no knowledge which does not at least partially include 'know how', and 'know how' is largely specific to a particular discipline (see pp.6-7). In the present context it is the historian's 'know how', and it follows that mere communication of the fruit of scholarship in the absence of any acquaintance with its procedures is quite inadequate - even apart from the decisive objection that differences of interpretation among historians mean that there is often no universally agreed and unambiguous body of information to be 'communicated'. No solution to this difficulty is to be found in the facile practice of merely presenting more than one account of a controversial event or period; for, if the student is given no insight into 'know how', he can make no critical appraisal of them, and hence, is quite incapable of judging between them. So far from being a solution to professional disagreements, the presentation of conflicting accounts compounds the difficulty. 'Know how' must be taught, for without it the student is impotent; but the nature of historians' disagreements strengthens the argument. For these are most often, and most bitterly, concerned with 'know that'. Procedural agreement is not merely normal, but the very things that enable rational disagreements about interpretation to exist. Clearly the procedures are what make History a discipline by giving it its professional character, and study which neglects them can hardly count as History at all.

But the orthodox chronological view largely ignores this and embraces the mistaken assumption that historical education consists of the pupils' coming to possess a definite and extended body of information. Because of this, chronological accident rather than intrinsic difficulty determines what is studied when, and any match which is achieved between the latter and the pupils' level of maturity is as fortuitous as it is rare. The consequence is, of course, that in order to be made intelligible to the younger pupils the earlier periods of History have to be arbitrarily simplified - often, indeed, falsified - by a gross caricature of those aspects (for example, politics) which are too hard for them to study properly.

The 'line of development' approach represents an attempt to meet these difficulties by dropping out those areas of content which are judged too difficult for younger pupils and concentrating on a few themes (such as the development of housing or transport) and charting their courses through the centuries. (see Jeffrey, 1935, 1936, 1948) But this is equally faulty in terms of the analysis of History. The chosen theme is typically presented as if it were a completely autonomous matter divorced from radically changing social contexts.

It might seem that if enough lines of development are pursued this danger will be avoided; and so it would of course - by definition. (What does 'enough' mean?) But the result would no longer be a 'line of development' course. Enough lines would mean as many as were necessary to expose the entire networks of connections between the direct object of study and all other aspects of the social context; but a 'line of development' (say of transport over 300

years), because it is extended in time, relates not to one social context, but to many. To attempt the complete colligatory linkage and to make a reconstruction, one would have repeatedly to pause and explain - for example, the whole complex of factors favourable to changes in ship design or the development of the internal combustion engine - and in that case, of course, it would no longer be a line of development approach. Consistently to follow a line of development is to proffer an account of change which is at best seriously inadequate. It thus violates the theoretical requirement that History is explanatory (by mistaking partial description for explanation), and flouts the need for reconstruction.

A third approach to History teaching certainly breaks away from the error of a fixed body of information to be transmitted, and stresses enquiry. In recent years it has become much more common to modify formal instruction and rigid chronological courses with 'creative' or 'imaginative' activity in which the child is invited to reconstruct some aspect of the past for himself. The weakness of this new approach is that it often ignores the degree to which historical source materials and enquiry techniques are specific. Any shift away from mere 'know that' and towards reconstruction is to be welcomed; but, as has already been shown, reconstruction is quite impossible except on the basis of evidence classified and handled by appropriate techniques - and this needs to be emphasised when considering teaching. Frequently the new 'activity' approach is not practised upon, or disciplined by, genuine evidence, and, consequently, is not shaped by its proper use. All too often, little genuine evidence is presented (in which case the reconstruction becomes mere imaginative composition, or art, or handwork, without any basis in fact) or it is presented uncritically, not as something out of which a narrative or picture or model can be constructed by inference, cross-referencing and so on, but as a substitute for any such operations. Frequently the pupil is simply told "Find out all you can about ..." without being given any idea of what sources of genuine information are available or how to identify and use them or even that some of the things he may 'find out' are better founded than others. All too often any information whatever which relates to the matter under review is uncritically used, and the procedures of enquiry are assumed to involve little more than the ability to read. 'Research' may become a mere comprehension exercise. Often no criticism of sources is undertaken - how does the writer know this? Was he in a position to know? What is his point of view? and so on. But without these 'contextual' questions and, of course, the particular knowledge which they presuppose, the whole operation is a mere travesty of enquiry. There is in any case a strong tendency for children to accept 'information' gained from books or from adults without more ado as 'true'. This 'face value' acceptance is precisely why a critical approach is so important. It cannot be said that indiscriminating modern enquiry method is a reliable way of producing it.(5)

The remedy lies in the proper use of sources both for composing the work and for criticising it. Certainly the open-ended, or 'free thinking' approach rightly insisted upon by modern educationists is necessary in History; but "the price of effective free thinking ... is submission to the disciplines imposed by the principles of historical method". (Thomson, 1969, p.35) In History (as so often in life) inferences have to be drawn and decisions taken

on the basis of evidence which is incomplete, by means of imaginative reconstruction limited and disciplined by that evidence and criticised in terms of it. True, not everything can be directly based upon evidence - that is the consequence of its incompleteness. But imaginative reconstruction must be consistent with the evidence, and this necessarily requires that the pupils be introduced to sources and to the appropriate ways of handling them.

It is in response to this requirement (and in keeping with the diminished importance attached to the mere acquisition of information in strict chronological sequence) that the 'patch' approach has largely developed.

The essence of the patch approach is that it studies in depth a very limited period. This has several virtues. It is clearly calculated to avoid the long 'tunnels', dissociated from the social context, of the line of development approach. Study in depth of a limited period would seem likely to uncover the connections between many aspects of a society, and the leisurely pace permitted by the limited time span makes the extended use of sources more likely, so that particular evidence would be well served. By the same token, the approach should result in a richly textured contextual frame. As one authority puts it, "What are the virtues of a 'patch' study? They give children time to soak themselves in one small area, familiarise themselves with source materials, cultivate skills in handling documents, explore areas other than the political .. and acquire mastery of this small field". (Lamont, W., 1972, p.179)

Thus, crucial epistemological flaws are likely to be avoided and important virtues secured. However, there is a serious fault. The 'patch' approach (if exclusively followed) lacks continuity. A place/period (say, Medieval Glasgow) is studied and the pupils then jump to a quite unconnected subject (say, Renaissance Florence). No matter how the connection is made it cannot be of equal depth and richness to the two patches, for if it were it would be, of course, another patch. A patch approach which studies everything in depth which is studied at all is thus either very disconnected in that arbitrary unbridged jumps are made from period to period, or is necessarily confined to a very short time span, so that all the 'patches' are contiguous. Both, but especially the discontinuous type, (which is what is usually meant by 'patch') may be open to the very serious objection, in terms of the epistemological analysis above, that they do not result in a narrative which is explanatory of change. If contiguous, the patches may embrace a period so short that change is not striking enough to be made salient for children; if discontinuous the change between the patch periods chosen is obvious, but inexplicable, since no explanation is yielded by what the pupils study of how and why it occurred - all the more so as different patches are likely to be chosen partly on the basis of difference and contrast.

Moreover, by no means does the patch approach in practice necessarily fulfil its theoretical possibilities. As Lamont remarks (p.167), children may "stop copying down passages from text books ... and start copying down passages from glossy Jackdaw-type archive kits". The provision of sources is no guarantee of their adequate use, and of course the patch approach is not necessarily source-based at all. Lamont (pp.168, 183) rather surprisingly singles

out the "Then and There" series for almost unqualified praise. In fact, some of the titles in this series seem to rest upon the very assumption which he rightly criticises - that change of method is redundant provided content is changed. One volume in the series may be taken as an example of an almost complete adherence to the conventional 'telling/know that' approach applied to new (and admittedly interesting) material. The chosen work is "Glasgow and the Tobacco Lords", by Norman Nichol, 1966.

Almost no sources appear in the book and no use of them is accordingly required of the children. The text is a straightforward 'know that' narrative; much of its information is interesting, but hardly ever does the author mention or identify the sources upon which its confident statements are (presumably) based - and still less is their reliability critically examined. The contextual frame consists of being exhorted to imagine oneself in 18th century Glasgow, and in Virginia, and by the transparent and ineffective device of writing in the first person plural. The "Things to Do" section contains questions many of which have scarcely any value or relevance for historical education. Some of these, re-numbered 1-14 for unambiguous discussion, may be considered.

THINGS TO FIND OUT

1. On page 79 are lists of things sold in 18th century shops. Find out what all these were and discover all you can from these lists about the differences between their way of living and ours (for example, do we need wig machines today?)
2. If you live near Glasgow, find out how many of the steeples mentioned in Chapter 1 still stand, where King William's statue is now, what the old Grammar School is called today.
3. If you live elsewhere find the name of the oldest newspaper in your area, the name of the oldest school, and discover which industry started off your own town or city.

THINGS TO WRITE

4. Write two letters to a Glasgow newspaper in the 18th century, one arguing that tobacco is good for curing illnesses and the other that tobacco is bad for health.
5. Write a story about the adventures of a fifteen-year-old boy who answers the advertisement for a post in Jamaica and finds himself sailing to Virginia instead.
6. Write either a conversation of Tobacco Lords over their wine and snuff or a conversation of the Tobacco Ladies over their tea.
7. Imagine you are faced with the task of getting a dozen hogs-heads of tobacco to the river; describe how you would do it.

THINGS TO DRAW

8. Design an 18th century advertisement for tobacco (see page 11).
9. Make diagrams to show the different kinds of ship mentioned in Chapter 6 and give each its correct name.
10. Paint a picture, from the description given in Chapter 7, of what you imagine a tobacco plantation was like.

THINGS TO DISCUSS

11. Is a closed corporation a good way of governing a town? (see page 27) How are cities like Glasgow governed today?
12. Is buying on credit a good idea? Argue this from the point of view of a Tobacco Lord and a planter. What are your views on buying on credit in the modern world?
13. Should the Virginian planters have used slaves? Discuss this firstly from the point of view of the 18th century planters and secondly in the light of what has happened since.
14. What do you think of a Grammar School education in the 18th century? Ought schools to teach grammar?

Of these numbers 4, 6 and (especially) 5, embrace the fallacy that constructing an historical narrative is a simple matter. There is no recognition of the complexities involved in this operation (see below pp.49-50) and no training whatever is provided in selection, discrimination and use of material relevant to the task. Question 6, in particular, assumes the existence of what the book does next to nothing to provide - the rich deposit of background knowledge which has been called contextual frame.

Question 3 is revealing. It is an example of genuine historical enquiry, but while it prescribes the task, it gives no guidance whatever as to how it is to be attempted. This is precisely the sort of question with which historical education should be concerned for younger and less able pupils and for which materials should accordingly be provided, together with training in their appropriate use. But the book lacks all bearing on the question set, and, given the aptness of the question to historical education, this lack reveals the book's inadequacy more graphically than any specific criticisms of it.

Question 13 is objectionable on two grounds. If the exercise is to be in historical thinking, the question of slavery must be discussed (as the first half of the question implies) in the terms in which it appeared to 18th century planters; but the text comes nowhere near providing the information adequate for this. The chance of an authentic reconstruction of situation, fundamental to historical work, is thus small; it is further diminished by the disastrous confusion of understanding with moralising implicit in the wording ("Should", not "Why did?"). 18th century planters would, of course, typically discuss the question in economic rather than moral terms, and the wording thus leads the pupil away from any sympathetic identification with the past as it was.

Another fundamental and closely related fault is found in the second half of the question, where the pupil is instructed to apply hindsight. It is to be used not to the better understanding of the rationale and consequences of slavery (its correct use) but, at least tacitly, to the application of the moral judgements of one age (the present) to another. This anachronistic procedure is a gross misuse of hindsight, which (as has been shown) is to reveal the significance of events by revealing their results, not to pass judgement on them in terms of a set of (modern) values foreign to their period. Far from being the means to understanding, hindsight becomes the source of those ignorant, censorious, and patronising attitudes towards the past which produce the smugly meliorist misconceptions of the present and future noted among pupils, and rightly deplored, by Mr. Booth. (Booth, p.70-71)

In short, the book, despite its interesting information, fails at almost every point when tested against the analysis of History. The pupils are presented with what they should be given the materials in some measure to construct - a finished narrative. This they are given no opportunity to check or criticise since it is based on undisclosed sources (or none - there is no way of telling). Contextual frame is transparently thin and conceptual frame almost entirely absent. The book in fact well illustrates the point made above - that the patch approach is likely to be weak in its conceptual frame of reference, since, being limited in time and subject, a plurality of analogous instances of a general principle is unlikely to be encountered. The explanatory colligatory chains barely appear and a gross misuse of hindsight is prompted.

The patch approach may thus fail resoundingly. The reason for this possible failure should be clear from the discussion which exposes them; it is the lack of a coherent and detailed epistemological 'model' of what a subject is in the light of which the 'patch' chosen may be appropriately structured. Given, for example, a theory which prescribes 'know how' and which further reveals what 'know how' entails for History, then the heavily 'telling/know that' approach criticised would be avoided and the appropriate source-based activity set up. Again, the errors exposed in the discussion of the questions set by Mr. Nichol would suggest that the author has no clear idea of knowledge and its subdivision into discrete forms each with its own criteria and procedures. His implied view of a historical narrative almost identifies it with mere free composition (otherwise he would appreciate and meet the need for carefully graded and specific practice in the requisite operations), and arouses the suspicion that he has no clear idea of what History is. In short, it is just that lack of epistemological analysis whose importance was stressed above which is responsible for the grave flaws in the practical production.

The criticism of these various approaches could be summarised by saying that none of them certainly satisfies either the general criteria of knowledge or the specific criteria of historical knowledge as a valid pedagogical approach must do. It is true that schools are not attempting to train professional historians, and of course there will be many very significant differences between the professional historian's practice and what the teacher attempts to do with his pupils. But these differences should, on epistemological criteria, be of a very different kind from those which

actually characterise the practical approaches just discussed. What the pupils should be doing, it is suggested, is acquiring some competence in the use of the skills of historical enquiry, and some information established and authenticated by use of those skills. Since the skills of historical enquiry cannot be learned apart from engaging in its study, there is no alternative to the pupils having experience, and, by implication, extended experience, in the use of sources.

There is one way indeed in which the pupil may be advantageously placed with regard to using sources. Precisely because he may be unaware of the outcome of an event, he may sometimes escape from the limitations which hindsight imposes (along, of course, with the great advantages which it bestows) upon the professional historian. Given that he is firmly placed in a context structured by the evidence, the questions "What would you do?" "What would you expect?" can generate genuine hypotheses which, growing out of evidence, can be checked against further evidence and thus confirmed or modified. In the latter case the question may then arise of why the hypothesis was incorrect, and reasons (again in terms of evidence) can be given to account for this. In this way expectations can be corrected in terms of the particular evidence and generalisations accordingly modified and refined. For this reason reconstruction rather than hindsight is to be stressed in teaching, particularly in the earlier stages.

All these considerations combine to suggest a criterion for deciding upon a course for a given group of children. It should be one where they can handle (in terms of rudimentary background knowledge and half-formed expectations) the particular evidence which the enquiry involves. It seems to follow that the younger the child (and thus the less he knows) the more limited in scope and the more concrete in nature the chosen enquiry should be. And since his background knowledge is likely to be heavily concentrated upon his own personal environment, if indeed it is not confined to it, there would seem to be a strong case for commencing with local studies and working through these towards matters of more general significance. The important point is that the problem of using sources is greatly eased by this approach. Local affairs obviously do not involve questions of 'high politics' remote from the child's understanding, and a genuine study of them may be made, whereas the attempt to present (say) problems of foreign policy to young pupils cannot but do violence to the complexity of the questions involved in the attempt, in any case vain, to enable the child to understand what is involved. It is a commonplace, of course, that children are prematurely confronted with too high a level of generalisation in history teaching (Jahoda, 1952/3). The fact that much (though not all) of the content of local studies will not be taken on to more and more sophisticated levels is not the essential point. The children are learning genuine skills of enquiry by their introduction to the use of original evidence.

This proposal admirably fits both epistemological and instructional requirements. For a further important fact about historical work is that valid historical narratives can be written on many different levels of generality - which can supply both the grading of difficulty and the continuity which valid school courses require. And

such 'grading' clearly fits closely into Bruner's 'spiral curriculum' provided attention is focused on procedures in using sources. For these - the sources and the procedures for their use - may (it is argued) be represented and experienced at several different levels of complexity provided that content is appropriately chosen.

The question of how, and how far, History may be spiralled will be considered as follows. First, a small number of recent writings relevant to the problem is critically considered (Chapter III); then the spiral model of one key aspect of History (evidence) is considered, followed by examples of the spiralling of a concept, of narrative and of procedures (Chapter IV); and finally, two specimen courses which (it is hoped) exemplify some of the principles brought out are described (Chapter V).

CHAPTER III

CRITIQUE OF SOME RECENT WORK

It is important first of all to distinguish between real and apparent spiral suggestions. Much recent work has been concerned with applying Piaget's theories to History teaching, and this has produced proposals which, since they call for presentation graded according to varying levels of pupil maturity, appear to suggest spiral structures. In fact this leads to attempts to categorise History learning into age-tied mental stages which are in fact the reverse of spirals. The problem is not regarded (as in a spirated approach it must be) as one of how to represent features which (because they are the essential features of History) must figure in any teaching of it; instead each feature is differentiated according to its (presumed) level of intrinsic difficulty and is presented only to children of an age to which it is deemed (on shaky Piagetian grounds) to be appropriate.

The danger of seeking to categorise History learning into age-tied mental stages is well illustrated by Mr. M. Honeybone (1971, pp. 147-151). He cites much research (6) in support of this argument, but a central flaw in this and other related work is that the failure of most pupils to master the concepts of orthodox school History may be the consequence of premature presentation of the most difficult concepts (and in an unpalatable form) rather than of pupils' inability (through mental immaturity) to conceptualise at all. This is not merely a question of linguistic (symbolic mode) representation (although on Brunerian grounds that would in itself be an obstacle for younger and less able children) but of the kind of issues (generally the abstract concepts of 'high politics') which are presented. For these, exactly because they are abstract and concepts, must necessarily presuppose the more concrete percepts (and simpler conceptual experience) out of which they may develop.

It is this which decisively favours Mr. Honeybone's advocacy of visual experience, for whereas high-level abstract concepts can hardly be represented in other than symbolic mode, a verbal rendering of concrete detail is often feeble compared to what can be achieved by visual means. The use of that mode (language) tends strongly to prescribe abstract conceptual content, for that is what it can do best. The medium, even if it is not quite the message, at least powerfully affects what message will be encoded. This perhaps explains why simpler text books seem to bring about little improvement in learning (Honeybone, p.49). Any use of the linguistic medium, whether simple or complex in form, tends to select what it does best, and a bias towards abstract content is still likely. In that event the concepts themselves are likely to be diluted and weakened in presentation and hence a further obstacle to their mastery is added. If, on the other hand, the simpler book moves away from concepts towards more concrete detail it is being used for a content which, being a verbal medium, it is not very well equipped to represent.

However, this applies to the account of the historian (or text book) in the attempt to give an explanation. It by no means necessarily holds for his raw material (sources). The reason is clear. Many

even of the documents of History - and by no means all sources are documentary - have few conceptual complexities because, being largely produced in the routine course of workaday life, their concern is not with high-level explanation. They often do not deal in abstractions. Abstractions are often what the historian gleanes (by hypothesising, inference, cross-referencing etc.) from the study of their particulars. Hypothesising, deduction and inference, that is, are not exclusively high-level operations applicable only to abstract material, but operations which can be undertaken at many levels on a wide range of materials. The inability of many pupils to think formally in History, found in so many researches, results, it is suggested, from the failure to build gradually, but explicitly, towards fully formal thought by providing graded experiences in reasoning on more concrete materials related to the abstract concepts with which the pupil must ultimately deal and upon which the reports of failure are commonly based. The result is to deprive the pupil of the perceptual (and simple conceptual) underpinning appropriate to such concepts. The discovered failure is thus almost a foregone conclusion, and leaves open the possibility that on different and simpler material a simpler level of conceptual thought may be possible.

The need is thus to construct History courses which give ample acquaintance with such perceptual and simple conceptual experience. But this can certainly not be obtained from the historian's finished explanations; for these, by definition, have transcended such matters and rendered them unrecognisable by assimilation. To present the pupil with the finished explanation without any prior experience of how it is constructed is thus to deprive him of any way of penetrating the meaning of its concepts - except, perhaps, from the context provided by the explanation itself. But this context - the historian's narrative - is itself highly conceptual, and the extreme difficulty which children are known to experience in understanding abstract concepts from context alone is easy to understand. It involves using the unintelligible to explain what is not understood.

It is often argued, to the contrary, that it is not the historian's explanations as such which are presented to the pupils but simplifications of them designed to lead ultimately to their full appreciation. The argument is often reinforced (or even based upon) the claim that, since children cannot use sources as professional historians do, they cannot meaningfully do so at all, and the best way of initiating them into the mode of thought is by the simplifications of its finished products. If the present work is correct this argument contains a double fallacy. The 'spiral' approach raises the possibility of children using sources in ways which may gradually grow in maturity towards professional practice (though not, of course, reaching it); and, secondly, the route prescribed is a dead end; for it is the 'simpler text book' fallacy already exposed (p.25) and surely further discredited by practical experience.

What, then, is to be done? How many courses providing the 'perceptual (and simple conceptual) underpinning' prerequisite for mature conceptualising be constructed? The answer is clearly given by the nature of the historian's enquiry. For it is not any sort of perceptual (and simple conceptual) experience which is primarily needed.

Historical knowledge is the product of enquiry based on particular sorts of source material - whose nature determines the appropriate sorts of the particular enquiry techniques applied. There can be no better materials for the acquisition of the required perceptual (and simple conceptual) experience than those of the type which historians actually use. In short, what is needed is regular experience of using the source materials of various kinds and of steadily growing difficulty. Indeed the 'growing difficulty' may be a function of the questions the child learns to put to the sources as well as of the sources themselves.

It is here that Mr. Honeybone's argument is least helpful. Trapped in the assumption of age-tied stages, which underlie the research he admirably summarises, he fails seriously to consider the possibility that explanatory thinking is not an 'all at once' ability which it is vain to cultivate until the critical age of its appearance is reached. It is simply assumed that "the child has not the experience for effective explanatory thinking; in consequence he should be investigating practical skills". Thus his warm endorsement of the use of sources is for reasons which greatly undervalue what their use can achieve. They are to be used for motivational reasons, and because mere familiarity with them will make "the explanatory concepts of the historians ... far better understood when the time comes" (1971, p.151).

But this is mere assertion. What matters is not just familiarity with sources, but their varied use, and, through this, a growing apprehension of what knowledge they can yield and what questions may sensibly be put to them. This is, surely, how historians build explanations, and it is in this way that their (mature) explanations may be understood "when the time comes". The correct application of this last phrase (wrongly tied by Mr. Honeybone to chronological age) is to the acquisition (to an adequate degree) of appropriate prerequisite experience without which the hoped-for comprehension will not appear - as the very research cited by Mr. Honeybone shows. (Da Silva and Hallam, for example, demonstrate that, as things are, many pupils even of 16 are not capable of abstract understanding and explanation in History.) Obviously, since the acquisition of such prerequisites consumes time, mature comprehension is roughly age linked; but this is very different from asserting that it is different in kind from anything possible before a particular age.

The distinction between genuine historical programmes in which most main procedures are represented at all ages, and age-tied serialisations where particular procedures exclusively engage attention before others are broached at all should now be clear. Mr. Honeybone's argument (and that of the evidence he summarises) seems insecure. The validity and power of the spiral model for History may be emphasised by a brief review of further recent work which, while not explicitly advocating a spiral approach, can best be implemented by it.

Dr. J.B. Coltham's work comes near to articulating a spiral structure and to repudiating the error of serialisation of procedures. She insists that "the actual nature of the evidence being used is highly relevant to the decision about the possible level of difficulty" (1971, p.32). This implies that a given child may be capable

of 'formal' operations for some tasks and with some materials long before his thinking is generally formal, and as Dr. Coltham's subsequent argument and examples make clear, the same evidence may be used in ways which call upon both concrete and formal thinking (1971, p.34-5). One might expect that she would clinch the clear implication - namely, recommend a use of evidence so that it may be spiralled; but this is not actually done, and as a result Dr. Coltham's often admirable argument is left at a rather general and indecisive level (1971, p.41-2).

In fact, the 'spiral' development towards which so much of her argument points would be the means of resolving some of the difficulties with which the specifically historical section of her discussion commences. These may be briefly summarised and discussed. They are incompleteness and possible bias of the evidence; the fact that History is mainly concerned with the doings of adults; the difficulties posed by the abstract language of History; the difficulty of the concept of time; and, finally, the identity of the body of historical knowledge (if one exists) which children must come to know (Coltham, 1971, p.30-31).

Of these, the last has already been dismissed as a misunderstanding of History (see pp.18-19 above). The second, third and fourth difficulties are also mitigated when the (erroneous) view of History as a body of knowledge is replaced by stress upon procedural features. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that they are real difficulties. It is not true that all historical study involves adult activity of which children have no experience and in which they are not interested - war and unemployment are examples to the contrary; see Chapter V. Yet eventually this is so; while abstract terms (Power, State) or abstract uses of everyday words (Law, Church) do not characterise all reputable historical work, yet if the learner's experience of History is to be comprehensive he must encounter them. But the solution is obvious. It is the choice of content matched to the maturity of the pupil and built into a connected structure so that crude percepts are steadily developed into rounded concepts. In short, it is a spiral. The fourth (time) difficulty may be met in the same way. Dr. Coltham herself identifies the relevant principle when she distinguishes between logical time sequences (e.g. cause and effect) and merely contingent ones (e.g. that Charles I was born after the defeat of the Spanish Armada). To cope with the 'time' difficulty, material may be structured so that cause and effect become more and more pervasive as work becomes more detailed and difficult. As this happens and the narrative becomes 'denser', so will the need for accurate chronology grow, since the number of time sequences which are merely contingent will diminish and those acquiring a logical (e.g. causal) significance will increase. A spiral structure seems admirably to fit this.

As to the first difficulty, here, too, the spiral curriculum affords the solution, but the two questions - incompleteness and bias - may be treated differently. For, once the erroneous view that all historical evidence is written is abandoned, the 'source' from which reconstruction has to be made can be of such a kind that 'bias' is hardly a relevant consideration. As an example the Northern Irish project mentioned below involved the 'reconstruction' of a ruined castle, requiring the drawing of inferences,

and extrapolation often at a quite complicated level; but it would be absurd to speak of the ruins being 'biased'. They are simply "by Time's fell hand defaced" - and provide (amongst other things) a useful introduction to the difference between chance and intent in the production of imperfect evidence. But the human aspects of the enquiry - even at the (seemingly) humble level of reconstruction of diet and dress - are another matter. The (largely English) sources are often grossly abusive of Irish habits - and this very grossness makes the bias easy to detect.(7) At a more subtle level still, the assumptions clearly underlying (for example) despatches sent to Dublin by officers in the field would have to be drawn out - and so on. Very few of the youngest children (10-year-olds) can operate at all these levels; but a graded approach is exactly the point of a spiral.

Already the framework of a spiral is indicated. Within one project relevant evidence may be encountered at very different levels of complexity (using the presence of bias as the criterion, for example). The problems of incompleteness and bias are susceptible to the spiral.

Dr. Coltham and Dr. Fines (1971) perhaps come nearer to useful prescription than Dr. Coltham herself. They identify nineteen sorts of behaviour or objectives (grouped into four main divisions) which sound History teaching will seek to promote. To make discussion of their programme fully intelligible, the framework may be presented: (pp.4-5)

"To start with, then, here are the headings and sub-headings for the whole framework:

A.	ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE STUDY OF HISTORY	(pages 6-9)
	1. Attending.....	6
	2. Responding.....	7
	3. Imagining.....	7
B.	NATURE OF THE DISCIPLINES	(pages 9-16)
	1. Nature of information.....	10
	2. Organising procedures.....	12
	3. Products.....	13
C.	SKILLS AND ABILITIES	(pages 16-23)
	1. Vocabulary acquisition.....	16
	2. Reference skills.....	17
	3. Memorisation.....	17
	4. Comprehension.....	18
	5. Translation.....	18
	6. Analysis.....	19
	7. Extrapolation.....	20
	8. Synthesis.....	20
	9. Judgement and evaluation.....	21
	10. Communication skills.....	21

D. EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES OF STUDY

(pages 23-28)

1. Insight..... 25
2. Knowledge of values..... 25
3. Reasoned judgement..... 26"

Nowhere in the ensuing expansion of this programme is spiralling specifically recommended, but the reiterated insistence that all listed behaviours and objectives must occur at every stage of development points to a spirated learning structure. Thus, for example, the authors insist that all three behaviours grouped under "Attitudes towards the study of History" must "appear at all ages and stages for effective learning of History to take place". (p.8) Again, it is stressed that the three divisions of Section B ("Nature of the disciplines") are not a developmental sequence. "All three aspects constituting the discipline will be on-going together ...;" (p.14) and the ten categories of Section C "do not follow each other in a developmental sequence". (p.22)

Unfortunately, however, the insistence is left largely on a general level, and only the fact that its content is a framework containing many specific components, to many of which it is applied, makes it appear more practically helpful than the remarks of the other authors discussed. The weakness of this generality may best be appreciated by an example juxtaposing the behaviours which are (rightly) identified as manifesting 'empathy' with the seriously misleading treatment of the topic of slavery given as a practical example of their progressive development.

Instances of the behaviours to be trained are listed as follows:

"Describes historical incident with sign of personal involvement;

Constructs a story about a period in which characters are portrayed in the round;

Peoples an historic building with characters who are true in action and thought to the particular period;

Represents in dramatic form feelings and actions according to human experience and historical evidence;

Identifies with a character under study so as to be able to declare the view-point of this character on the problems (etc.) contemporary to him/her". (p.8)

Undoubtedly these are behaviours which constitute a large part of historical study - for they are a large part of what constitutes reconstruction. Equally valid is the general statement of how they are to be trained - by the use of evidence and the skills which such use involves. But this formulation seems seriously inadequate for the prescription of a specific course, for it recommends that younger children "enter imaginatively into the situation of being a slave and being a slave owner". (p.9)

The example coincidentally echoes the discussion of Nichol's book

above, where to imagine oneself a slave-owner was shown to be a very complex business at any level which is historically valid - which involves, that is, empathetic identification based upon the knowledge and assimilation of evidence (and especially contextual frame), much of which involves factors (e.g. economic) far removed from young children's experience and competence. The study recommended thus seems inconsistent with the authors' general insistence (p.8) that historical 'imagining' must be based on sources. Since the evidence which the pupil requires to 'empathise' with a slave-owner is not available to him, the proposed task seems an open invitation to fantasy, to an "imaginative leap made without attention to possibility or probability" - the very danger against which the authors emphatically warn (p.20). It might, perhaps, be argued that the process of 'emphathising' is itself to be spiralled so that the child moves from elementary linkage with the slave owner to more and more complete empathy as the necessary evidence is made available to his maturing mind. If so, this spiral needs to be made explicit, and it has not been; and many more suitable subjects for early practice in empathy could surely be found for young children than one so remote from their experience. This last point - remoteness from experience - would contradict the authors' rightful suggestion that local History may be especially valuable for younger children - mainly on motivational grounds (pp.14-15). Again a general recommendation lacks prescriptive force in that it fails to link up with the specific practical proposal made - which turns out indeed, to be inconsistent with it. Specifically, the particular manifestation of the desired behaviour (imagining oneself a slave owner) fails to connect with the level of evidence - particularly the contextual frame - which it presupposes. The task prescribed is thus beyond the younger child because of a serious mis-match between the particular manifestation of the desired behaviour chosen (empathy) and the evidence and related enquiry skills necessary to produce it - the complexity of the latter being seriously under-estimated. In a word, the (correct) general specification fails to 'translate' into appropriate specific plans.

A further weakness is found in the treatment of analysis. Analysis of objectives may be valuable, but the permanent danger is that intrinsic, though partial, connections may be overlooked and fractured because of more obvious, but not more important, differences - with the result that objectives may fail to be prescriptive because of the too general language in which they are stated, and of incapa-citating overlap among them. A good example of such 'overlap' in the present framework is that between "Imagining" (in Section A) and "Extrapolation" (in Section C). The account given of extrapolation includes every form of imagining which is historically valid. The authors distinguish between genuine historical reconstruction (extrapolation) and an "imaginative leap made without attention to possibility or probability" ... "mere fantasy" ... "a form of egocentricity which can best be described as wishful thinking". Nothing which did not fall into the first category would be historically valid, and extrapolation thus includes imagining. As this example shows, more time may (fruitlessly) be spent in trying to decide which objective one is covering than in the actual operation in which the coverage consists.

Particularly faulty in this respect are the overall classifications

provided by Sections B and C. ("The Nature of the Discipline" and "Skills and Abilities") For, if the argument of the present work is correct these are inseparable, and the authors themselves are clearly uneasily aware of the artificiality of their division. In Section B, reference on to C is frequently made, and much of B - particularly B2 ("Organising Procedures") - is a mere skeleton with only one overall objective.

"In this section the agreed ways of handling the information of History ... are set out without the addition of detailed objectives which appear to be more appropriately placed in Section C." The reason given for this postponement is "that only as he masters the relevant skills will the learner come to know what historical method is (learning by doing)". (p.12)

But if this is so (and the argument of the present work - see pp.24-26 above - would strongly suggest that it is (then it is impossible to see on what ground Sections B and C are separated. Certainly the authors' reason is not convincing. To argue that a pupil cannot be expected to practice a skill "purposefully and repeat the procedure on different material ... (unless ... he is aware beforehand of the nature of the skill which he is aiming to master" (p.12) is objectionable on several grounds. It clearly indicates that the list is for pupil use, but it is only in the context of an actual enquiry that the skills listed become more than abstractions. Of course source material must be evaluated in terms of "authenticity, relevance, coherence, credibility" (p.13) and so on; but the test of what is authentic or the sense of what counts as relevant or coherent or credible are dependent upon context. The concept cannot be acquired by prior prescription but only built up by extended relevant experience. If more than mere listing of appropriate activities is involved for the pupil (as is implied by the requirement (p.12) that he should receive "at least a description of the activity") then description must take the form of deciding what procedures are most appropriate to particular enquiries in which the pupil is actually engaging, any one of which will almost certainly involve only some of the (listed) skills. In this event, the list is redundant and apt to confuse. In fact the insightful practice and transfer of skills which the authors rightly seek will be achieved not by their prior specifications but by growing grasp of what (for example) 'relevance' is in practice. No such list as the authors' is useful for the student in advance of learning; to compile a check list such as the authors' is what the pupil should be able to do when (and only when) he has mastered the skills listed. Section B2, as it stands, is redundant.

Certainly it may be helpful for the teacher to have a check list of (say) the organising procedures to be identified and practised; but unless these are shown to follow from a proper analysis of History itself - i.e. to be intrinsic and not optional - the danger is that the authors' framework becomes like an à la carte menu from which almost any idiosyncratic selection may be made on grounds which have little to do with intrinsically historical criteria.

Roberts, for example, describes his use of the 'Framework' as follows:

"We would not begin to suggest that our objectives and associated

methods of assessment would suit many other schools. We merely selected the Framework from those objectives which fitted our philosophy and seemed appropriate to the needs of our pupils. When other teachers follow the same process, they may well give priority to quite different objectives. For example, we do very little documentary work at Brays Grove yet the pages of Teaching History show clearly that more and more teachers give high priority to this approach. For them, Section B of the Framework (the "Nature of the Discipline"), which we have not used, will be most helpful. This is why the Framework is important. It provides a comprehensive list of aims, defined in terms of learner behaviour, against which history teachers and examining boards can evaluate (and modify where necessary) their courses and methods of assessment." (Roberts, 1972, pp.349-50)

Here the implication that teachers should pick and choose reaches the point where documentary work is neglected and the nature of the discipline totally ignored - and yet the course can still be justified as History by means of the Framework. The criterion of choice is (apparently) whatever objectives teachers happen whimsically to entertain, or whatever 'needs' their pupils are believed or assumed to have. The ultimately unsatisfactory nature of the Framework is shown by its compatibility with an indefinite number of courses which differ not merely in content - that would not matter - but in criteria. In short, it lacks prescriptive power; and this lack is ultimately due to its failure to give central importance to a careful analysis of what historical knowledge is, and then to derive all 'behavioural objectives' from this so that they become mandatory, not optional.(8)

As things stand, no grounds are shown by the Framework for accepting that the behaviours specified are the ones which it is most appropriate to bring about. It is this which vitiates Coltham's second proposed use for the Framework. It might, she says, be used to provide a check list which could evaluate some existing syllabus or scheme. In this case it "would help to answer the questions: Does this syllabus or scheme serve the attainment of a range of objectives? Are there any important omissions?" (1971, p.278) But where have the listed objectives been justified as the right ones to aim at? Nothing could provide such justification except analysis of the discipline; here must be found the justification, as well as the mere enumeration, of the behaviours specified. Not only is no such analysis offered, but the brief account of the nature of the discipline (Section B) is much the weakest of the four sections.

The strong compatibility of the various accounts discussed with a spiral curriculum on the one hand, and their relative lack of prescriptive power on the other, highlights what is lacking, and what the task for theory is. It is to make the spiral explicit by a structural analysis of each key feature of a discipline, and by its embodiment in a spiral, and this is now to be attempted, first by discussing examples of one key feature of History as an example, and then by outlining two proposed courses for children which (it is hoped) exemplify the principles defended. (Chapter V)

1. Evidence

The example chosen of a key feature to be spiralled is evidence itself. The choice is not fortuitous. Heavy stress has been laid upon the importance of procedures in History, and the choice of evidence as the feature to be investigated enables the question of how those procedures may be made accessible to pupils to be broached. This is a crucial question not only because of the stress laid on it in this work but because the possibility of children using sources is often denied.

The use of evidence may best be approached through an authoritative statement of what is involved, and the relevant portions of G.R. Elton's admirable Practice of History (1969) may be summarised for this purpose.

1. "Historical research does not consist, as beginners in particular often suppose, in the pursuit of some particular evidence which will answer a particular question ... (p.88).

The historian must make one initial choice, of main area of study ... But after that ... he will, or should, ask no specific questions" (of his evidence) "until he has absorbed what it says ... (His) mind will indeed soon react with questions, but these are the questions suggested by the evidence" (p.83) and not by some pragmatic or propagandist purpose extrinsic to it ... "After this initial stage the questions arising will be pursued specifically ... now the historian specifically seeks evidence to answer his questions." (p.84)

As to the choice of evidence itself, Elton's admirably clear method is to show what is ideally required.

2. "Historical research ... consists of an exhaustive and exhausting review of everything that may conceivably be germane to a given investigation." (p.88)

This counsel of perfection is shown to be unattainable in full, but it indicates the proper principle upon which (unavoidable) selection should be based. It involves making a comprehensive study of a first selection of sources which is believed (on good grounds) to be representative of the whole, and using the search for answers to the specific questions suggested by this first study as the principle for selection from the remainder of the sources.(9)

3. Elton then turns to the question of criticising evidence. This "means two things; establishing its genuineness and assessing its proper significance". (p.97) He shows that "the forger is not a serious enemy to the ... historian" since the techniques for exposing forgery are adequate and not particularly difficult, and a document does not lose, but merely changes, its significance when it is shown to be spurious. (pp.98-100)

The evaluation of evidence is of far more importance and complexity. Elton helpfully divides genuine evidence into two kinds - "that produced specifically for (the historian's) attention, and that produced for some other purpose". (pp.100-101) The historian must be clear to which class the material he is studying belongs, for the overall purpose of the material is, or at least is the key to, much of its meaning and significance. The historian's task clearly "differs according as he faces an attempt to influence and persuade his like or an attempt to influence men long dead - or sometimes to influence nobody". (p.101)

The first category, as Elton points out, is relatively easy to use; moreover the second is "far and away the most important and common" (p.101) and the present discussion focuses upon this category not only for this reason but because it offers the direct lead into a specifically epistemological (historical) component of enquiry over and above that of mere logic. Elton makes this point well.

"At first sight it might seem that a financial account, the record of a court case, or of a house, cannot bring trouble to the historian. As long as he can read or recognise them they will, since they were never meant to deceive tell him the truth. But the point is, on the one hand, that to see them is not necessarily to understand them, and on the other that they may well have been intended to deceive someone else. A proper understanding of a given document involves separating the specific from common form and grasping the process by which it came into existence ... The student ... does not grasp the true meaning until he has thoroughly acquainted himself with the organisation that produced it, the purpose for which it was produced and the difference between common form and the exceptional."(10)

4. Finally, Elton's treatment of "asking the right questions" (pp.109-110), may be considered.

Asking the right questions of a body of evidence has four features. First, the questions must be "geared to what is contained in the matter to be enquired from" (the connection is obvious between this point and Elton's insistence that evidence must itself suggest the questions put to it); second, the questions must exhaust the potential of the evidence available; third, questions must be limited to what the evidence can answer - but this includes finding answers to old questions which have so far proved intractable - i.e. showing that the evidence will, after all, answer questions hitherto put to it unavailingly (this third feature is obviously linked to the first); and fourthly, the asking of new right questions - i.e. questions which the evidence will answer, but which have never been put to it before.

The spiral curriculum seems admirably to fit this account, and its application may now be discussed point by point, the first two being taken together, and the fourth being considered before the third.

Elton's first criterion is that, in the first instance, the evidence must not be approached with questions extrinsic to it(11), or rummaged for answers, but allowed to suggest the questions which

further evidence may be selected to answer. In other words, the sources themselves suggest the criteria for their own selection. (Note 5, pp.59-61)

The second criterion - really prerequisite to the first - is that the original body of evidence encountered must not itself be selected. (Note 6, pp.59-61)

With children it might seem the second condition is impossible to fulfil. In no realistic sense can children digest a body of evidence which is anywhere near a comprehensive sampling of any historical problem. The evidence (if indeed they are capable of using it at all) must always be heavily pre-selected for them, not selected by them, and therefore questions for further study, which determine the selection of further evidence, do not arise from the play of their own minds upon a representative body of genuine evidence but have to be more or less surreptitiously introduced by the teacher. Often the result is indistinguishable from the contradiction of the first principle. In effect questions deriving from the teacher are used to approach 'evidence' pre-selected by him to provide answers to them, and the result is a travesty of what it ignorantly or deceitfully pretends to represent - genuine historical enquiry.

But this indictment is less damning than it appears. Elton himself makes it clear that to use all the evidence bearing on a problem is a counsel of perfection - a guide for proper ambition, not a realisable goal. Moreover, 'real' History is not the same as 'mature' History, and how is maturity ever to be reached if no preliminary but genuine steps towards it are to be allowed? This must involve teaching - Elton himself insists that "documents thrown naked before the untrained mind turn from pearls to paste ... The task of teaching involves explanation and instruction" - and makes this quite explicit in another of his own works.

Each section of documents in his Tudor Constitution (1960) is prefaced by an introduction aimed to put them in context with the aid of copious references; and, of course, his collection is inevitably highly selected - so that even undergraduates are to work with pre-selected materials. Moreover, his criteria of selection are comprehensiveness and importance (pp.vi-vii). In a word, Elton has attempted to provide undergraduates with a microcosm of the evidence on the Tudor Constitution, and already the shape of a spiral may be discerned. At a more advanced level of study the 'microcosm' would of course, be inadequate, and what would be needed (what in fact must have been used by Elton himself in preparing the book) would be something much nearer to the whole body of documents which exist. Even then nice problems of deciding whether a particular document was relevant to strictly Constitutional matters would arise - problems, that is, of selection; Elton himself (p.vii) identifies certain topics as "a trifle marginal in a consideration of the Tudor Constitution", although he would have liked to include them. In short he had a problem of selection - and also of pre-selection, for his book was intended to replace an earlier collection of Tudor documents, and Elton had to start with his predecessor's work. Since he also had to produce a shorter book (p.vii) he had to select from it - that is, to make a selection from a pre-selection.

But why cannot this spiral be projected downwards, the teacher, or (simpler) book doing for the child what Elton does for the undergraduate? The belief that this cannot be done is due solely to the assumption (already heavily criticised) that the content of History must be 'high politics'. Given the exposure of this error and the focus on procedures (defined at length above) there is no reason at all why genuine, though of course preliminary, source-based work cannot be undertaken by schoolchildren. For, in the light of this discussion, pre-selection of the original evidence is shown to be no more than a necessary stage in teaching and learning. There is no reason whatever why a reputable selection of evidence on a suitable topic cannot be presented to children; there is no reason why they cannot digest it and why their minds cannot suggest questions in response to which further selection may be made. Certainly children will need help in meeting the first and second criteria in Elton's point 4 - that the questions asked must be appropriate to the evidence (in the sense that the evidence is capable of yielding answers to them) and that they must exhaust the evidence - (i.e. that all questions which the evidence can answer must be posed). But is not the same true (at their admittedly higher level of study and more abstract content) of undergraduates? If not, why the introduction to each section of Elton's documents? And why cannot a properly prepared introduction from the teacher fulfil the same purpose for the children?

The third and fourth criteria of point 4 - that questions put to the evidence must be those, and only those, which the evidence can in fact answer; and that new appropriate questions be put to the evidence whenever possible - are admittedly harder to meet; but this is generally true. At any level of study on any material it is important, and difficult, to get pupils to see that the explanatory power of all bodies of evidence is limited and there are questions which it is fair, but fruitless, to pose because answers are not to be had. Similarly at any level it is difficult to get pupils to see that, despite earlier failures, a body of evidence can sometimes be made to yield answers to intractable questions.(12) But it is not more difficult than it is important, and to conclude in advance and on quite arbitrary grounds that children cannot do it is as unreasonable as it is impoverishing.

As to the fourth criterion of point 4 - hitting upon hitherto fruitless questions which the evidence in fact proves capable of answering - it is indeed unlikely that such an exercise will often be appropriate for children. But only at very high levels of study indeed is it likely to occur at all, and to use its impracticality as a ground for a general exclusion of pupils from source work is self-defeating. For, almost certainly this ability grows through continual practice in the other three (the first, second and third criteria of "asking the right questions" - see p.37 above); and if those are not to be practised it never will grow at all. Moreover, it is important to remember that the material used by the child will often not be the same as that used by the scholar. No new questions will be put to this evidence because no questions whatever may ever have been put to it before. The pupil has to learn some of the skills which the historian has already mastered, and, in the early stages, any question he can put to the evidence is a new one for this purpose.(13)

The third main point into which Elton's analysis was divided has been left till last because it is the most intractable for the present purpose - showing how genuine, though not mature, historical study is feasible for children. It is the criticism and evaluation of documents. Elton is quite right when he asserts that "It is here that professional learning comes into its own; only full-ranging knowledge of what occurs in the papers of a given period or problem will prevent misapprehensions". (1969, p.102) And this "full-ranging knowledge" of "the organisation that produced a document, the purpose for which it was produced, and the difference between common form and the exceptional" involves what the present work has called 'contextual evidence'. The historian has it; the child has not. This is the fact (rather than the innocuous one of pre-selection) which really destroys any possibility of children using sources as a professional historian does. But it is difficult to credit that any thoughtful person ever entertained that as a feasible objective, and it does not follow that there exist no other levels of activity at which valid, though incomplete and provisional, experience of source-based work can be had. Moreover this fact - that the skills of mature historians have to be learned - indicates the self-defeating nature of the conclusion that children should not use documents; for, on that argument, how are they ever to learn to do so?

And such work may well be relevant even to the main difficulty itself. What marks the historian off from the pupil (apart, of course from his adulthood) is his detailed contextual frame of reference, and frame and sources stand in a reciprocal relationship. While sources are rightly to be used in the light of the frame, the frame is gradually developed from and through the use of sources. A brief description of an attempt to achieve this may clarify the argument. Consider this extract from a letter (slightly amended) used with senior primary and younger secondary children during their study of the Nine Years War.

"For as Tyrone is the dishonestest rebel of the world, so is he the most cowardly, never making good any fight but skirmishing in passes, bogs, woods, fords, and in all places of advantage. And the rebels hold it no dishonour to run away; for the best sconce and castle for their security is their feet."

The children were first asked simply to digest what the passage says(14), treating it as information. They were then asked what this told us - really told us. The first clue, of course, is the use of the name "Tyrone" rather than O'Neil. But in order to see this as a clue one must understand that Tyrone and O'Neil were the same person and that Tyrone was his English title - so that the author of the letter was probably English(15). At once, surely, this raises the question of the writer's objectivity. (If this 'enabling knowledge' is not possessed, the question can be approached the other way round. The hostile tone of "dishonestest rebel" can be used to cause the children to conjecture that the writer is English - the Irish would clearly never describe the English as "rebels" - a hypothesis which can then be checked by ascertaining the identity of Tyrone.) In either of these ways the pupil's initial commitment to 'face value' acceptance(16) of the Irish as cowards is broken down by revealing the bias of the writer. But what is 'bias'? For, of course, the letter confronts us with

something more interesting than simple prejudice. The children need to be provoked into closer scrutiny of the exact nature of the 'bias', and thence into consideration of its possible causes.

What is it, exactly, that the writer is so angry about? The answer to this requires close scrutiny of the details of his complaint, and then its relation to context. The reader must engage in a little reconstruction. Here is a war going on, year after year, with no apparent likelihood of a decision; here is a representative of one side accusing the other of cowardly tactics. But from the duration of the war those tactics cannot have been altogether ineffective; so there is more to it than mere cowardice and more to the writer's attitude than mere undifferentiated anger. Set to the writer's attitude this background, there is a hint of frustration about it, and the reasons for that frustration seem to be closely associated with the reasons for the Irish choice of tactics. And this, of course, requires that they be set in context. To understand the writer's feelings and attitude - to empathise with him - the facts of the conduct of the war provide the necessary explanation - they become the enabling knowledge prerequisite to understanding the document, for apprehending its whole (or real) message, and thus for considering the question of the writer's 'bias' at a level adequate to reveal its true nature and significance.

So far the critical use of a source and empathy have been shown to be interdependent, and both are seen to depend on an essential underpinning of knowledge. How that essential knowledge was acquired by the children affords an interesting example of the further use of sources and the powerful employment of ikonic, and, to some small degree, enactive, representation.

The essential problem is to relate the geographical and technical facts of the case - to show how the nature of the terrain, the weapons, logistics and military capabilities of the two sides shaped and conduct of the war so as to make the Englishman's letter fully explicable.

This was attempted as follows. First, the nature of the terrain was examined. A scholarly article dealing with the history of the subject was broken down into a set of definite statements about fairly precise areas and the source of each noted. Each of these was printed on a separate sheet. A large scale map ($\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 mile) of Ulster was prepared and mounted and then cut up so that each piece represented one piece of information. Like the articles, the representation was done on a county by county basis, and the whole work thus formed a jigsaw of Ulster. County by county, the children had to reconstruct historic Ulster by matching sheets and pieces - no fitting together was allowed until the matching was complete. The reconstruction was thus carried out through the use of sources of which the pieces were an ikonic translation. The pieces, and ultimately, the counties were then fitted together and a complete reconstruction of historical Ulster was the result.

A word is called for on the nature of the sources. There were three main groups of source. First, contemporary documents such as Bagenall's Description of Ulster, 1586; second, topographical works published early in the 18th century; and third, the Ordnance Survey Memoirs of the mid-19th century. Manifestly these are not equivalent in quality, and the difference between an eye-witness

description and inference based on a later one was emphasised. The children were constantly caused to argue, "If there was a deep bog, or a forest of oaks, in this place in (say) 1703, it is virtually certain that bog or forest were there in the 1590s". (No drainage works of any importance were carried out in Ulster in the 17th century, and how long do oaks take to grow?) The difference in the sources was emphasised by different forms of print, and different colour of sheet, according to whether or not the source was contemporary. Finally, if no information was available for an area its piece was left blank and, if inference from a source back to Tudor times was shaky, dotted lines were used on the corresponding piece. In this way, a critical attitude to the sources was encouraged.

The large map of boggy land covered with forest, scrub, moor and mountain which emerged was reinforced by slides taken by the present author which exactly tally with the descriptions in the sources. This obviously strengthened reliance placed in the latter and added a visual source to the verbal ones so far relied on. Attention was next turned to the equipment of the two sides. Each side was sub-divided into infantry and cavalry, and the attempt was made to recreate, in a set of slides, the precise details of the conditions under which a typical member of each sub-group campaigned, and then to draw out the implications of this, given that the war was fought over the kind of terrain already discovered from the jigsaw. Together terrain and logistics constitute the 'enabling knowledge' necessary to empathise with our soldier, and, to some extent, with the commanders as their plans and decisions are set in the recreated context problems seen from the inside. For reasons of space, only one of the detailed enquiries will be given here, but the other three sub-groups were similarly treated. (The entire programme was presented in the form of slides.)

The investigation of the English infantry began with a contemporary print of "A captain of pike". A copy drawing of this was then presented with items of armour named, followed by pictures of the pieces of armour, front and side views. By discussion the children gathered the elementary point of weight (especially in contrast to the Irish soldiers similarly investigated). The question then arose "How heavy?" A slide of a letter to the writer from the Tower of London was presented giving the weights of the various items, which the children added together. A further slide presented a letter from an English commander complaining first of the lack of cart-horses and then of the fact that since the soldiers could only carry about a week's supply of food their mobility was greatly reduced. The next few slides presented information about a man's rations for a week. The weight of this was added to that of the armour and the total found to be about that of a small child. The point of this was driven home by slides of a chase over boggy ground in which the adult pursuer carried a child of the right weight on her back. The slide of her collapse was immediately followed by a drawing of a contemporary soldier in the same posture and finally, an extract from a further contemporary letter was shown:

"The road was broken causey beset on both sides with bogs where the Irish might skip but the English could not go."

which the children had to explain. (They had already, and similarly, studied the lightly armed and unarmoured Irish.)

By the time all four sub-groups had been studied in this way and related both to one another and to the nature of the terrain the nature of the original 'bias' was fully understood. And children had been led into empathy via a reconstruction of the writer's predicament built from interpretable selection from amongst the facts of the case gleaned from reputable sources critically appraised. And from empathy comes understanding. 'Simple prejudice' is seen to be no more an adequate explanation of the letter than face-value acceptance would be a valid response to it. They must now explain, from the same reconstruction, the meaning of:

"and they (the Irish) hold it no dishonour to run away; for the best sponce and castle for their security is their feet."

In particular, what does the last sentence mean, and how would an Irishman express it?

The next task was to draw up probable battle plans for the two sides - that is, to draw out the implications of what had been reconstructed. These were then checked against, and modified in terms of, the historical record. But to describe that would go beyond the limits of the present example, which well illustrates the inseparability in practice of the various aspects of historical enquiry, and consequently demonstrates conclusively the error of serialising them for which Mr. Honeybone was criticised earlier. Indeed the extended and exclusive use in early stages of documents merely for illustration cannot but imply to immature minds that the argument they 'illustrate' is 'proved' by their existence. (17) So far from preparing pupils for a (later) critical use of documents, the seriated approach seems likely to inhibit that possibility. In fact the danger will be avoided if the true nature of historical enquiry is analysed and used as the model for teaching. All, or nearly all, the activities described are likely to be present at all levels of enquiry, and if any is not, that is a contingent rather than a structural matter. It should become obvious how closely connected are many of the activities described, which, indeed, can only be separated for analysis and specification.

The reciprocal relationship of sources and contextual frame of reference thus meets, adequately though provisionally, the objection that the children's lack of the latter must preclude their use of the former. On the contrary it is just that lack which necessitates that use; for use of sources is a very powerful means of ultimately correcting the lack.

2. Concept, procedure and narrative

It is high time to say something more specific about the spiral curriculum. If we ask "What is to be spiralled?" the answer to "Those features of History which analysis has shown to be distinctive" - or in Bruner's terms, the basic ideas of History.

The suggestion that History is not marked by networks of concepts peculiar to it does not, of course, mean that the concepts met with in particular historical studies cannot be spiralled. But it does mean that it is impossible to do more than give examples. It is

proposed to take one concept, illustrate how it might be spiralled in an actual teaching context, and try to draw out what the whole process involved.

As far as the second feature of a form of knowledge is concerned - propositional knowledge - the attempt is made to spiral the forms distinctive of History. These, it was suggested, are first an explanatory narrative which reconstructs some section of the past by selection from amongst the bodies of evidence available - the sources. Such reconstruction includes - indeed, largely consists of - setting up the contextual frame of reference. This in turn links to and/or develops the pupil's general frame of reference. Secondly, propositional knowledge is, of course, concerned with the sources themselves. Spiralling the latter, in particular, will extensively involve ikonic representation.

Finally the procedural aspect of History is concerned with appropriate ways of handling sources, and, as such, is hardly separable from the treatment of propositional knowledge. Discussion of the two features is, therefore, often combined in what follows.

It is important that the context in which this discussion is set be understood. This consists of two actual projects carried out (under the author's overall direction) by teachers with their normal classes. It is not a theoretical abstraction. This section commences with detailed examples of 'spiralling'. These are followed by a description of the two projects.

The concept chosen is 'strategic importance'. This arose in the course of the study of the Nine Years War (1593-1603), already referred to, carried out with Northern Irish children of 10-13. Without grasp of the concept the conduct of the War would be almost unintelligible. An account of the attempt to teach the concept may be given - with the proviso that the sequence described is not, of course, the only possible one with these materials. Exactly because it sounds mysterious, and also because it contains so many important elements of the question, one might begin with this passage:

Sir Calisthenes Brooke to the Privy Council, 20 May 1598

"Besides the Erne is so necessary to Connaught, as the joining of it to the province excludes them from aid and hope. It is the convenientest place of garrison to hold the people on both sides to obedience; a strait between those countries; and at all times if the kingdom were in rebellion, it may be victualled."

It is a fair assumption that primary school children, at any rate, will not make much of this at first. The task of explication begins.

One starts with an individual castle and considers why it is where it is, and the shape it is. (If this can include a visit, so much the better, obviously; but this is not essential.) One castle actually visited, for example, was built on top of a steep slope surrounded on two sides by a bog. On the other sides, naturally enough, an outer defensive wall had to be built forming an enclosure between it and the castle building. Attention was focused not merely on the general design but upon the exact location of each gun hole,

which was related to every other and to the siting of the flanking towers covering the castle walls. The strategic design of the castle was brought out by showing how the gun holes, taken together, formed a network of defensive fire covering the entire approach to the castle. This was made clear to the children by a series of siege games in which the castle had to be "defended" and "attacked" by opposing teams (Rogers and Aston, 1977).

The general siting of the castle and of its constituent parts thus broached the concept of strategic importance. It had now to be extended by showing that a strong defensive site was not the only reason for the siting of a castle. The castle would be built to control something else which was important. Drawing upon the knowledge of the difficulties regular soldiers had in moving by land (described above, and already learned) the children are led to propose an alternative way for the English to move around in Ulster - by water. This, of course, leads directly back to Brooke's last point and can easily be clinched by any of several source references. The best is probably provided by the account of the siege and capture of Enniskillen castle in 1593. We have the account written to Dublin by the English commander, Captain Dowdall, and a drawing against which the letters can be checked (and vice versa) by an English soldier, John Thomas. (18) (They corroborate one another. The children are asked to consider how strong the 'corroboration' is. Is it, perhaps, merely collusion? Most unlikely. What would be the motive, and how likely is it that a common soldier would be privy to the commander's official correspondence? In this way, again, a critical approach is fostered.)

The relevant passages, tape-recorded as well as printed for the children, in Dowdall's letters read:

Captain Dowdall to Lord Deputy, January 26, 1593

"... Wee had an intent to scoure the Logh donewarde, but wee were prevented by their insconement, which wee did surprise, and were loth to forgoe them. From our camp at Inishkillen this xxvith daie of January, 1593."

Captain Dowdall to Lord Deputy, February 2, 1593

"Righte Honable my approved good Lo: the 9 daie of our siege of Eniskillin, wee did assault the said Castle by boates, by engins and by sapp, and by scaling, and gott the Barbican, and after had the Castle, which Castle is nowe (our good God be praised) in her Majesties hand, with smale losse. Nowe I do intend to p'cede in ransacking of all their sconces they have in their Loughes and llands wheresoever, and that I hope, within these 10 daies, they shall not saie they have anie one thing in Fermanaghe, that they holde against her Majesties pleasure."

In short, says Dowdall, we wished to secure control of the entire Erne waterway; but as long as the Irish held the castle we couldn't (a glance at a map shows way); therefore we had to capture the castle and now we have done so all is plain sailing. Within a week the whole of Fermanagh should be safely in our hands.

Enniskillen, then, is a prime example of a place of strategic importance, and the fact that it controls a waterway - the Erne - again leads back to Brooke's report. By analogy, Belleek and Ballyshannon castles are turned into further examples, and, if a little chronological liberty be permissible, the whole chain of castles built around Lough Erne a few years later may be traced with the aid of a good map - each on a site strong in itself or at some vital point (to control a ford, for example), and all taken together forming a mutually reinforcing network. Brooke's original argument is now considerably clearer. Understanding is completed by presenting slides of a series of three maps showing how the Ulster Irish can easily get aid from neighbouring Connaught if they control the Erne, but that such aid is impossible if the English do so. The maps show green (Irish) or red (English) castles respectively and a tape recorder plays Brooke's remarks while the children watch. (All written sources were put on to tape so that they could be heard and read simultaneously or separately.)

The next stage is to generalise still further. By analogy, Lough Neagh and the Bann are similarly analysed, and Mountjoy's solution of the Blackwater problem - and, hence, the absolutely crucial importance of Charlemont - is emphasised. The way in which this enables the English to avoid the ideal guerrilla terrain of Southern Tyrone is dramatically highlighted by the way O'Neill did not even attempt to hold Dungannon (his 'capital'). He burned it and withdrew.

This leads directly into Mountjoy's 'blockhouse' policy and breaks the link, so far a most useful scaffolding but now unduly restricting, between a strategically important site and a waterway. The distance between forts now becomes crucial and the children have to grasp that every fort has to reinforce every other. Contemporary pictures showing the design of the forts are important here. The fact that each fort had a huge outer enclosure, far bigger than any conceivable garrison could require, provides a pregnant hint. The enclosures, the children learn, were to accommodate the regiments of cavalry constantly on the move between different forts. (This can be established from the sources. The documents name the regiments' commanders, and state, from time to time, where each regiment is based. It is thus possible at least intermittently to trace the journeyings of individual regiments.) Yet individual siting remains important, of course, and a good example to take is Mount Norris. It is barely ten miles short of Armagh and we know why it was built. There was, at the time, no grass for the horses in Armagh, and the fort was built on a well-protected hillock. Logistics affect strategic considerations.

There are several higher 'twists' to the spiral, up to and including the strategic importance of Ireland itself in the context of late-16th-century war and diplomacy. But, except in highly schematised form (see below, pp.54-56), these are not broached with such young children because the enabling knowledge prerequisite to grasping the concept in the context of such complex content would be beyond them. Enough has perhaps been said to illustrate the spiralling of a concept. The children have come a long way from the shape of an individual castle and placing of its fire holes. But the essential idea of a rational structure built (or plan implemented) by intelligent men with an explicable military purpose which lays strategic imperatives upon them is invariant.

The use made of sources so far described may have caused some disquiet, because they appear to have been selected on very narrow criteria of relevance to a particular purpose. For this reason the question of spiralling procedures will be taken next, and that of spiralling a narrative last. Procedures may conveniently be considered in terms of Elton's discussion outlined earlier.

It was suggested above (p.15) that the views of Elton and Carr could be combined in teaching History to children. Indeed Elton's exclusion of prior questions must also be modified by his further insistence (p.37 above) that questions put to sources must exhaust their significance, and be limited to matters the sources can answer; for of course the children cannot, for years to come, meet these requirements unaided. A suggested procedure which (as proposed above, p.16) combines prior questions and questions suggested by the sources themselves may be described.

As part of the Nine Years War project, a pack of extracts from the Annals of Ulster (also recorded on tape) and a series of slides of contemporary drawings of Ulster life were presented to the children. They could work singly or in groups as they wished, and were asked first, to answer questions on a prepared work sheet and, second, each to write down two or three further questions which the extracts suggested to them. One undoubted shortcoming (which would certainly be rectified if the work was repeated) was the failure to meet Elton's programme by causing the children to use a further selection of sources to answer the questions they formulated. The work sheet questions were designed (and it was hoped that the children's questions would follow suit) to draw out overall significance of documents rather than trivial details, so that a reconstruction of what life in Ulster was like could be undertaken. For example the Annalists, in reporting the death of a chief or of anyone of whom they wish to speak well, almost invariably mention his hospitality, valour and patronage of the bards. Whether the individual chiefs named were in fact such paragons of generosity, valour, hospitality and culture as they are said to have been is of limited importance - it is more uncorroborated 'face value' information. What these descriptions do reveal is the qualities thought admirable in a man (or at least in a chief) and that tells us something important about Ulster society. Similarly, just who captured which castle from whom, or to whom it was then given, is probably of little importance in an initial enquiry. What matters is the light the campaigning throws upon the clan system, and the endemic warfare which characterised Ulster; precisely how many cows were captured in which raids into what territories is not interesting; but the light thrown on the nature of the Ulster economy by the frequent mention of cows is - and so on. (19) What is being built from this use of the sources is a reconstruction which, when performed, provides much of the contextual frame for further study.

The pupils themselves practised the closely related procedure of selection from among the documents. They were given a list of suggested topics (and asked to suggest others themselves) and then, working in groups, required to sort the documents and pictures under the various headings, criticising each other's choices. This is only one instance of the great importance attached to discussion and argument throughout the work. Criticism and the response to it is expected to provoke gradually ripening grasp of criteria and of

resourcefulness in applying them. This process represents for the children the model of History as a contested and open enquiry, (see p.13 above) and the role of the teacher in it seems quite crucial in tactfully shaping discussion in accordance with the criteria. Since several sources were relevant to more than one topic valuable cross-referencing, with relevance as the criterion, was involved; or, to put it in the language of the present work, editing the sources caused the intrinsic links among the various colligations to be strikingly demonstrated.

It is suggested that, taken together, the last two paragraphs, together with pp.40-43, indicates how Elton's first, second and fourth points may in some measure be attempted by children - and obviously the various operations described can be attempted at graded levels of difficulty with more or less teacher help, more or less searching questions, and, especially, sources of more or less complex content. In short, they can all be spiralled. There remains Elton's third point concerning the need for "full-ranging knowledge of what occurs in the papers of a given period" - what this work describes as the contextual frame of reference. As already stated, (p.40 above) of course such knowledge cannot be employed; but, it is submitted, the kind of activities briefly sketched above provide the means by which the immense task of acquiring it may be begun. All in all, the procedural character of History can, in some measure, be experienced by children.

There remains the propositional aspect. This last section leads smoothly into this for, it will be recalled, propositional knowledge in History has two aspects - the sources, and the narratives built from them. As has been suggested, children can come to 'know' sources; the question of narratives may now be considered under two intimately related aspects - construction of a narrative for oneself, and appraisal of narratives presented to one. A presented narrative should consist of an account explanatory of the sources it embodies and rests upon which clearly, if tacitly, shows the criteria for their appropriate use; the narrative construction should be built up gradually and under guidance from sources made available, by practice of those criteria. The two aspects together show what a History course should include. For the moment the question of spiralling narrative construction is to be considered, the existence of adequate completed narratives and their supportive exemplary role being assumed for the time being.

Grounds have already been shown (pp.9-11) and some experimental evidence will presently be adduced (p.50) for believing narrative construction to be a very complex task - as seems likely from the very fact that a narrative is the ultimate product in History. Certainly its difficulty is normally greatly underrated. If it is to be valid and significant it presupposes some degree of competence in the related procedural operations outlined above. The 'rings' of the spiral for narrative construction are hard to specify (except in the trite sense that the content studied will itself constitute a spiral - simple content is easier to turn into a narrative than complex content) but the following suggestions can be made. Specific information established from appropriate use of adequate source material is the very first requirement. Even on simple content, the translation of authenticated particulars into a connected narrative is not easy - and certainly by no means automatic as much

current teaching (tacitly) assumes when teachers simply set children an account to write without more ado. Accordingly in working the fruits of these first enquiries towards an explanatory narrative the children might, as a first step, be asked to build a model. Children, of course, often know more than they can put into words - particularly written words - and it is here that Bruner's point that language is a technology best learned and extended in the context of action is valuable. The use of ikonic, and, perhaps, even more, enactive, representation provokes the requisite language by the need to translate kinaesthetic and visual knowledge of what is being studied into a form which makes what one knows communicable to others, and what is done explicable to them. The role of the teacher here is crucial, but supportive. It is to execute the minimum running repairs on the child's utterance needed to make it adequate, and to provide prompt and protective gap-filling with the necessary phrase whenever he is at a verbal loss.

As an instance primary children engaged in a project on the history of Clydebank were studying housing conditions from census returns and other contemporary material, mainly visual. Instead of being asked to write a description of 'my house in 1931' they built a scale model and also marked out in the classroom the actual floor space of a 'single end' (a Scottish one-roomed tenement house). The information was adequate to make a fairly detailed reconstruction, and from Census figures it could be shown how many people were likely to have lived in such a dwelling. The appropriate number of scale people were put into the model, and of children into the floor space. No direct test was made of the effectiveness of the work. The teacher however was struck by the interest shown by the children and the impression apparently made upon them. Any such operation should of course be accompanied by verbal discussion of what is to be done, and explanation of what one is doing. This is, in embryo, the first historical narrative.

As another example, the reconstruction of a ruined castle might be attempted, using contemporary source material as the guide for search, on the site, for traces of foundations etc. The mapping of these could be accompanied by discussion leading to inference from the traces to the reconstruction and the final result could be a drawing or model. After a good deal of particular knowledge has been established, the children may be given a product to criticise. This could be either model, picture or narrative. For example the Irish children, having mastered details of the dress, weapons and armour of the two sides in the Nine Years War might be confronted with a picture of a battle scene containing mistakes (20) - an Irish soldier wearing a morion or an English officer with a battle axe; or a model of a Plantation castle containing anachronistic features such as an over-complex structure, or garrisoned by men with out-of-period weapons might be presented. Again, this work should be continuously verbalised and every effort made to get the children to use correct technical terms ('arquebus', not 'rifla').

In these ways enactive and ikonic experience are used, as Bruner suggests, as props to early symbolic treatment of the content, and it is especially valuable if all discussion and explanation can be tape-recorded. Moving specifically to narrative construction, the tapes may be used as source material to supply answers to

Carefully graded questions which gradually become more complex and build into a simple narrative. The role of imagination in reconstruction is, at the lowest levels, gap-filling in an enquiry shaped so that the gaps are mere chinks between particulars directly ascertained from sources, and closely related to inference from them; as experience is gained so the gaps can be made bigger until the direct dependence of the work upon sources is replaced by a narrative largely independent of specific reference to them, but shot through with assumptions and presuppositions derived from them. Thus contextual frame rooted in knowledge of a mass of particulars is built up.

Intermediate stages are marked by 'egocentric' reconstructions, in which the child is asked to imagine himself as some historical person (preferably a child) or into some historical situation. It is important that the earlier efforts at this work should be shaped by specific questions and should be preceded by much experience of establishing particulars from the sources and fitting the pieces of information thus gained together. To ask inexperienced children to write on "A day in my life as a Stone Age Hunter", or a child living in Clydebank during the depression, is to invite the "I got up and the sun was shining and I had my breakfast and went out to play" type of response even when (as is often not the case) considerable experience of handling source material has been gained. The latter task (for instance) needs to be guided by specific pointers - what did the various members of the family do in the light of the sources? (Father perhaps went to the Labour Exchange (why? where was it?) and then - what did he do? What does the evidence suggest? Mother went shopping (what did she buy?) What were her choices and budgeting problems? Did she (could she?) get credit anywhere? Where? How much? Later in the day how did she deal with the tack-man?) All these and many similar questions need, in the early stages, to be made specific. They are to be answered in terms of items of particular evidence and the contextual frame of reference built out of this.

It is thus quite vain to look for a historically significant narrative until much experience of the sources has been obtained, and before a considerable, though incomplete, body of contextual evidence has been built up(21); a narrative requires the selection and application of particulars to a specific theme in terms of contextual evidence, and a supporting scaffolding of leading questions and pointers is needed to activate this and to sustain enquiry. As experience is gained so the leading questions may gradually be made fewer and more general, and this of course links with the growing complexity, generality, and abstraction of the content studied.(22) This is an additional reason for local studies with younger children; the far more concrete nature of the evidence, and of the questions arising, greatly eases the preliminary stages necessary for narrative construction.

The first course to be outlined concerns an attempt at reconstruction intended for senior primary children of life in Clydebank during a specified period. For ease of organisation the suggested enquiry may be subdivided into a number of related topics - housing, health, water supply, transport and employment among others. These form the colligations which, when combined, will constitute the reconstruction. The combination is facilitated by careful choice of key events whose context and explanation the colligation is to supply. The events will clearly be chosen because they are important within the colligation itself; but another criterion may be the linkage they offer to the other topics of the enquiry - i.e. to other colligations. In this way a network of cross-referencing key points may serve to bind the colligations into a genuine, if partial, reconstruction. Under employment, for instance, the stoppage of work on the "Queen Mary" (December 12, 1931) may be taken as a key event not only because of its dramatic importance within the employment colligation but because of its dire consequences for all other aspects of life in the town, which causes it also to be a key event in many of the other colligations, and, hence, facilitates their ultimate linkage. This key event may be fitted into the development of shipbuilding in Clydebank from its origin in 1871 - a colligation in its own right - which, since the yard actually preceded the town, will provide abundant links to the development of all the other colligations (housing - the workers must live somewhere); transport (the Yard needs materials - what? - and the workers have to be able to get to it); water supply (the Yard uses a lot of water - and this provides a close further link with housing, of course).

However, the links between the colligations will not all be equally strong, and by this variation of strength the process of reconstruction could be spiralled. Throughout their lengths all colligations would be loosely or tacitly connected. For example, the study of developments in the town's water supply - the provision of new reservoirs, filtering plant etc., - could not fail to connect generally with the developments in industry and housing, which alone explain why water supply developed at all. At this level of tacit, intermittent, and almost accidental connection the various colligations would constitute a 'sketch' of a reconstruction - reconstruction at the lowest level of the spiral. This might then be more fully articulated at those points of explicit linkage between the colligations provided by selected key events (such as the stoppage of work on the "Queen Mary" already referred to). This would provide a more rigorous and thorough reconstruction over a very limited period of time in that the key event would be explored specifically to expose its full range of consequences and connections; it would become a 'patch', and the loose relation of colligations (the lower-level reconstruction 'sketch') already undertaken would provide the context for this more detailed, though temporarily limited, enquiry.

As an example, suppose that the first months of 1932 were chosen. Detailed sources could be provided giving information, on say,

unemployment figures, what employment was still available, unemployment payments, supplementary grants (for example clothing), and food prices. This could be combined with information from (for example) the Census returns showing, amongst other things, the proportion of the population living in houses of various sizes, and with details of the incidence of disease from (for example) the reports of M.D.H. The children could then attempt a reconstruction not only in terms of information directly obtained from the sources but of inferences from them. For example, they might be asked to draw up shopping lists in terms of a rudimentary cost of living and a family income calculated from sources, or, using the Census returns, they might each work out in what size house they would have lived given the number in the family - and so on.

At the elementary level at which the primary school enquiry is conducted it should be clear that its colligations are very incomplete. The building of, and stoppage of work on, the "Queen Mary" (for example) is not fully to be explained in terms of developments in Clydebank shipbuilding, or in terms of its consequences for the town, but in the context of the wider social and political whole of which it was part. This incomplete treatment is deliberate, for it represents a contribution appropriate to the elementary level of the primary enquiry. The contribution of each (incomplete) colligation consists both of a specific strand of the enquiry and of adequate linkages with other aspects of it; that is, it adequately contributes to reconstruction. To attempt to carry, say, the shipbuilding colligation deeper as part of this enquiry would unbalance the work (by making one of its aspects far more complex than the others), weaken the linkage (by greatly increasing the number of points at which shipbuilding made no contact with the other colligations) and almost certainly involve the pupils in questions too difficult for them, since they would be unable to handle the requisite particular evidence and would lack the relevant conceptual or contextual frames.

The 'incompleteness' is thus really lack of comprehensiveness, and so what needs to be done at higher levels of the spiral is indicated by the gap between the account which a professional historian might give of 1932 and that given by the primary children. Exactly how this gap is to be bridged - or rather, in how many spirals it is to be covered - is not a question to which there is, a priori, only one answer; it is to be determined (if at all) by practical testing. But the general form spirals may appropriately take is clear. Suppose the "Queen Mary" stoppage is taken as a starting point. Once the fact has been firmly (and easily) established from the particular evidence available, the reasons for it would fall to be discussed. Explanation might be given in terms of the general depression of the Clyde and indeed of the whole of British shipbuilding. Again, this calls for explanation in terms of national, and, finally, world, economic problems, and, of course, a complete treatment could not be given except in terms of the appropriate political History, which might develop into the causes of the World War and hence to a study of national rivalries in the preceding decades. (This is one spiral which might be developed from the point of origin - 1932. It is not, of course, the only possible one.)

Side by side with the 'why' of the stoppage, its effect and significance would have to be examined. At the lowest spiral level this

would be concerned with the simplest of the strictly local facts - three thousand men thrown out of work, the effect on incomes, unemployment figures etc., but to each level of the 'why'? spiral briefly sketched above there would be a corresponding 'effects' level. Obviously, the course contained in such an interlocking of 'spirals' would cater for pupils over very large age and ability ranges, and progression up it would occupy much of the course of a pupil's school life. Starting with homely, concrete facts - the housing of their parents, a ship built in their own yard - the children follow a coherent and connected course constructed so that each level would be carried on in terms of an appropriate and adequate assemblage of source material and would offer a possible terminal point for individual pupils.

So far nothing has been said about criticising sources. It seems intuitively probable that direct reference - inference - criticism/evaluation will be a sequence of growing difficulty for children, but by no means does this imply that the operations believed to be more difficult should not figure at all in an elementary enquiry. (To agree to this would be to accept the very 'seriation' fallacy of Mr. Honeybone criticised above.) The need is to find material suitable for the elementary exercise of enquiry, and the same arguments which were held to imply the use of concrete materials for direct reference and indirect inference seem equally valid when criticism is involved. An example may be given.

At an enquiry into housing in Clydebank one witness presented a plausible argument against more Corporation houses being built, on the ground that there must already be a surplus of dwellings since (as he convincingly proved) many existing houses remained unlet. As on independent grounds (Census returns) 20,000 people are known to have been living three or more to a room, there was seemingly an intriguing conflict of evidence here. Its resolution is interesting. The unlet houses were privately built and on offer at rents well above Corporation levels (at a time of mass unemployment and deep poverty); and the witness was a private builder. Here, it is argued, a quite crucial historical procedure is breached. Public utterances may be almost worthless as evidence until their context is known, and here a very simple example is offered of the need to probe behind words uttered in order to grasp their full significance.

This example of criticism and appraisal of evidence is interesting because of its very elementary nature. To assess it, it is almost sufficient to know a few facts about the speaker, all of which are contained, directly or by inference, in the simple materials constituting the sources - in this case a newspaper report with verbatim quotations. Here, it is suggested, is a very low level of a spiral for criticising evidence; a higher - probably a very high - level of the criticism of sources would be offered by the evaluation of the Report and minutes of evidence of a Parliamentary Committee. Here the matter is highly complex, for the general report will not merely summarise the evidence of witnesses. Report and evidence will bear subtle testimony to the reliability of a witness - his occupation and interests revealed by cross-examination may be more revealing than what he says, just as the questions he is asked can tell a great deal about the interests involved, and thus lead into the purpose of the investigating Committee, its membership, and how it came to be set up.

The far greater complexity of this second example compared to the first may be indicated by taking a feature - self-interest - which will certainly be common to both, and considering what is necessary to establish and articulate it in the two cases. A vastly more numerous assemblage of particulars, set against a far more complex background knowledge, will be required in the second case compared to the simple, direct deduction from surface information adequate in the Clydebank example. This discussion has, it is hoped, linked theory to an actual practical programme by means of the spiral curriculum. However, three aspects of the discussion call for further comment - the seeming preference for modern History, the neglect of chronological order and the suspicion that argument in favour of a late introduction to 'high politics' has been justified by arguing from a special case (social and economic History).

Certainly modern History has advantages in that contextual frame is largely directly available because the assumptions of the society under scrutiny will be relatively close to the child's own experience, and the whole study will be about, and carried out by means of, things which are familiar to him. The neglect of chronological order also has advantages in that it illustrates the rightful predominance of structural considerations. Cause and effect - that is explanation - in History is ultimately a chronological matter, of course, but this does not imply, as is mistakenly, if tacitly, assumed, that the chronological order is the natural pattern for children's studies - still less that it must determine them. The order should be a sequence of sense units starting with and developing from those aspects of the ground to be covered which are most directly accessible to the child. Finally, the choice of social and economic, rather than political, History does avoid the intractable conceptual difficulties posed by 'high politics'. Economic and social History are much more susceptible to simplification and, hence, much easier to spiral.

On the other hand none of these considerations is conclusive. A spiral need not be grounded in modern History, could follow a chronological progression, and need not be based exclusively upon social and economic History in order to be viable. These points may briefly be illustrated by further reference to the Nine Years War study already mentioned.

It will be recalled that the concept of 'strategic importance' was chosen as an example of a concept to be spiralled (pp.43-46). This was done by means of a detailed reconstruction of the terrain and military realities of the situation, and it was there stated that, with such young children, this detailed reconstruction was limited to the immediate course of the war because of the excessive complexity of the 'enabling knowledge' prerequisite to higher levels of study. However, the question must surely arise of why the war occurred at all, and to this question the work on terrain, equipment, tactics and strategy so far undertaken by the children affords no answer. Nonetheless, some explanation is required or the war is left as a mere conundrum. A drastic and schematised simplification is therefore used. The source materials will have included several references to Irish contacts with Spain, and one source in particular will be emphasised:

From: O'Sullivan's Catholic History

O'Donnell besieges Enniskillen and sends a messenger to Spain to beg assistance from his Catholic Majesty.

After the retreat of the royal armies, O'Donnell, determined to avenge Maguire's losses without delay, hastened to besiege Enniskillen which the English had taken a few months earlier. As he had no brass cannon to batter the Castle it was easily defended by the English. O'Donnell seeing this, and thinking that it would be hard to liberate Ireland from the tyranny of the English without help from foreign princes, sent James O'Healy, Archbishop of Tuam, as ambassador to Philip II, Monarch of Spain. The bishop was most graciously received by the King, to whom he explained the feelings of O'Donnell and other Irish chiefs towards the Spaniards; their faith, constancy, bravery and military skill. Also he pointed out (what no one who knows the island doubts) that, Ireland once possessed, Scotland, England and Holland might with little difficulty be assailed and conquered by Spain.

Attention is focused on the last sentence. The children are caused to wonder what this might mean, and the answer is given by means of a set of maps with movable pieces. The Spanish Empire in Europe is shown and the importance of the Channel route demonstrated. Control of England is thus seen to be important to Spain. At first sight the Netherlands seems to offer the best case for her conquest; to stave this off England supports the revolt in the Netherlands, and the Armada campaign follows. Its failure makes Philip wonder if there may not be another way - and the strategic importance of Ireland, given her geographical position, is thus brought out. The revolt in Ulster is simplified into the mirror image of that in the Netherlands and the Spanish intervention and defeat at Kinsale is presented as corresponding to English action in the Low Countries.

This account of course is greatly - perhaps grossly - simplified, particularly in its chain of cause and effect, and cannot be regarded as satisfactory. Indeed, it seems open to exactly the same objection which was strenuously made to 'orthodox' teaching in that it wrongly chooses, and then has grossly to over-simplify, an inappropriate content - namely, high politics. It can only be justified on grounds of necessity - that it is the only way in which the 'why?' posed by the lower, and genuine, level of reconstruction can be answered with such young children. This reply is made adequate by the fact that the over-simplified account forms part of a spiral in which the principles involved (if not the precise content) will be moved on to more and more adequate treatment as the two levels of reconstruction involved here grow progressively closer together, for the same strategic principle will be met with throughout the study of Irish - or, indeed, European - History.

The value and crucial importance of the spiral curriculum, when structured (as Bruner in effect insists) by epistemological analysis, is thus clear. For History, at least, it is the means by which necessary vitiations of a course may be made acceptable by mitigating, and (later) remedying, their consequences. Even at the first (local) level some of the concepts (principally the strategic) with which the second level (international 'high politics') is concerned are being broached in a very concrete and elementary form. The reason for the separation is a matter of the necessary interplay

between particulars evidence and contextual frame explained above (pp.12-13). As there argued, mastery of contextual frames gradually develops from the manipulation of particular evidence, at any point in time they are accessible to the child at that level of complexity which corresponds to the level of particular evidence with which he can cope.

Thus, in the present case, the particulars needed for reconstruction at the first 'level' - details of topography, diet, weapons etc. - are directly accessible to primary children, whereas by contrast, knowledge of Philip's supply problems with America and with his European bankers, the position (and threat) of Mary, Queen of Scots, given Elizabeth's bastardy in Irish eyes, or the implications of the French Wars of Religion (which presupposes some working knowledge of their intricate details) are a few examples of the sort of particulars prerequisite to reconstruction at the second ('high politics') level. Manifestly, they could not possibly be mastered by young children; but the different levels of contextual frame and particular evidence appropriate to the two levels of study indicate how the merger of the two reconstructions is to take place. It will do so as the maturing pupils become more and more able to cope with more and more complex assemblages of evidence - a capacity hastened by, and firmly grounded in, that constant use of (simple) sources and broaching of (simple) conceptual issues (in this example strategic importance) which has characterised their earlier studies - the more limited and concrete aspects of which gradually drop out as the study proceeds. By the time William of Orange is reached, for example, the growing merger of the two levels should mean that the sort of particulars (weapons, armour, design and siting of individual castles) which loom so large in the first study should have largely given way to particulars related to a fuller appreciation of the broader strategic and, to some extent, political, issues; by the time the 1798 rising is reached this process should be still further advanced, and the Act of Union (for example) should be studied in something like its political context. And so on, up to the 1921 Treaty, or whatever terminal point is chosen. The essential principle is that study must be based upon a spiralling of sources so that no matter what period is studied the level at which this is done must be that for which the children can, and do, use sources appropriate to it. Slight deviations from this counsel of perfection may occasionally be necessary as in the example above, where if the war in Ulster were to be fully understood it had somehow to be located in its European context. With young children this could not be done in the manner, or at the level of rigour, which a source-based treatment would require, and an inevitable simplification was the result. It is hoped that the reasons for the exception indicate the criteria which can justify it; essentially such justification can only be given by the need to render explicable a larger enquiry, itself carried on in a source-based manner, to which the simplification is intrinsically necessary but strictly subordinate. It follows that such simplifications should in any case be infrequent, and that they will diminish in both scope and incidence as the pupils mature - genuine works of scholarship and a widening of source-based work coming more and more nearly to cover the whole of whatever study is undertaken. The partial departure from this principle at the lowest level of the spiral was discussed above.

This discussion should have corrected the impression perhaps created by the Clydebank example - that modern History must be studied, that chronological sequence must be ignored, and that the postponement of 'high politics' until a late level of the spiral was being justified by means of a special case (content chosen from social and economic History). On the contrary, as the Irish course shows, chronological sequence may be quite acceptable, so that modern History does not have to be the content chosen; on the other hand even where a chronological approach and political content are chosen, 'high politics' need to be postponed, and acceptable, though not perfect, ways of doing this can be found provided a spiral structure is employed.

(For an account of the practical trial of the Irish course in schools see Rogers 1978.)

It may be helpful, in conclusion, to try to draw together the main threads of the argument. Chapter I examines the question "What is History?" The argument has two parts: first a general account of the nature of knowledge and, second, an examination of historical knowledge. It was suggested that any form of knowledge has, perhaps, a threefold character - propositional, procedural, and conceptual. A crucial distinction between 'know that' and 'know how' was developed and heavy stress laid on children pursuing historical enquiries using sources of various kinds. Objections to this requirement were discussed. Doubt was cast on their validity on the ground that, provided suitable materials and presentation are employed, there is no reason to assume that children cannot work in the suggested manner.

This leads naturally into the question of 'teaching method', and Chapter II - "Teaching" - briefly expounded the theory believed to be most fruitful, that of Bruner. The chapter then attempted a critique of four main approaches to the teaching of History - 'orthodox chronological', 'lines of development', 'free enquiry', and 'patch'. All these are found wanting in terms of the theoretical position developed in Chapter I concerning the nature of historical knowledge. A return is made to Bruner's theory as offering a valid alternative, particularly the concept of the 'spiral' curriculum.

Chapter III accordingly offers a critique of a small number of influential writings on History teaching, seeking to show that, insofar as they are likely to bear fruit, they need to be restructured in terms of the spiral. In particular their Piagetian assumptions need to be sharply modified. Chapter IV considers the key question of children using evidence and concludes that this is quite feasible given a spiral approach. This is related to an actual programme of work carried out with children which also demonstrates the power and potential of visual (ikonic) representation. Next, the second half of the chapter describes the 'spiralling' of a key concept - strategic importance - in the context of the same practical programme. Finally the chapter concludes with the 'spiralling' of procedures and narrative, also in the context of practical work with children.

Chapter V describes two courses actually planned and carried out, one in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland. Actual choice of content is shown to be incidental. The principles defended in this work, articulated by the concept of 'spiral curriculum', enable valid and valuable courses to be constructed from almost any starting point.

- p.11 (1) E.H. Carr develops this point into a distinction between facts of the past and historical facts, and gives an illuminating example. (Carr, E.H., 1964, p.12)
- p.13 (2) For a much more detailed discussion of this point see my chapter in Dixon, K. (ed) (1972, pp.112-119) For the educational importance, see this work, pp.47-48 and pp. 48-49.
- p.15 (3) On the other hand, see Carr, p.23: "The duty of the historian to respect his facts is not exhausted by the obligation to see that his facts are accurate. He must seek to bring into the picture all known or knowable facts relevant, in one sense or another, to the theme on which he is engaged and to the interpretation proposed."
- p.18 (4) See pp.41-43. For an attempt at a corresponding use of enactive representation see Rogers, P.J. and Aston F. (1977). For specific examples relating to translation among the modes see p.49.
- p.20 (5) An example of children's tendency to face-value acceptance of an attempt to conduct a valid, though elementary, enquiry through reconstruction of context is given below, see note 16. It is not suggested that all 'enquiries' merit this criticism; but in so far as they do not it is because they meet the criteria indicated. It is the criteria which are important.
- p.27 (6) e.g. Hallam, R.N. (1970); da Silva, W.A. (1969); Charlton, K. (1953). See also Hallam, R.N. (1967); Hallam, R.N. (1972); Peel, E.A. (1965); Jahoda, G. (1963); Peel, E.A. (1967).
- p.31 (7) The problem of bias is complex. See Elton, G.R. (1969) pp.33-4, who shows (along with the safeguards against bias afforded by the scholarly community) the real though limited value of bias in that it often "enables (the historian) to look afresh at the facts of the past". A further value of bias is the way it ensures that all accounts are subjected to the most rigorous criticism. Even though some of it will thus be unfair, it at least gives the strongest possible guarantee that weaknesses will be exposed.
- p.35 (8) Dr. Coltham's own observations on this point are not very reassuring. She identifies two uses for the framework. Firstly it may be used as "a bias for drawing up a syllabus or a scheme". In that case teachers "might select a couple or half a dozen" (of the suggested objectives) "which they judge as suitable for their pupils". (Coltham, J.B. 1971, p.278)

- p.36 (9) Elton, G.R. (1969, p.93) His actual example concerns government involvement with Public Health after 1840. The records of government departments are suggested for the first 'unquestioning' study; other sources - Parliamentary papers, newspapers, memoirs etc. - may be used in the search for answers to the questions suggested by the first study.
- p.37 (10) Elton, G.R. (1967, p.102) His examples of this general argument are clear and convincing. See pp.101-102. Elton is, of course, concerned here with 'Contextual frame of reference'.
- p.37 (11) This was discussed above (p.15), where it was suggested that E.H. Carr's somewhat different view could combine with Elton's in the teaching of children.
- p.39 (12) That this is difficult seems to be necessarily true. Almost by definition the first attempts to find answers will use the most obvious routes. It follows that those sought later (when the obvious has proved to be in fact a cul de sac) are less obvious - that is, presumably more difficult.
- p.39 (13) See pp.15 & 25 above where it was shown how the pupil's ignorance may put him in a position of genuine enquiry to a greater extent than is possible for the professional historian.
- p.40 (14) The source passages were also recorded on tape to help the poorer readers.
- p.40 (15) Here, of course, is a spiral. At the lowest level all that is needed to comprehend the clue and use it to unlock the present problem is just that the name used tells us who is speaking. But for more comprehensive levels of understanding of the Irish crisis the full significance of this simple fact has to be grasped - not just that the Irish called him one thing and the English another, but the full political implications of the two names respectively.
- p.40 (16) The children using these materials showed a strong initial tendency to accept as true almost whatever the sources superficially said.
- p.43 (17) The further danger of a purely illustrative use of sources is that it is liable to get the child into the habit of picking out 'evidence' which supports the belief he already holds; so far from being a solvent of prejudice, 'evidence' thus becomes its bastion.
- p.45 (18) The capture of Enniskillen was represented as a game. Thomas' map was drawn on a steel sheet and the various things shown on it - boats, soldiers in armour, cannon etc., - were made into movable pieces mounted on magnetic tape. The rules for moving were the steps actually described in Dowdall's letters. The game was thus an ikonic translation of the sources.

- p.47 (19) It is worth remembering that all sources were recorded on tape so that the children could listen as well as (or instead of) reading. Given the stress on overall significance this went some way to equalise performance between good and poor readers. Because they must keep pace with the tape, the latter simply could not become enmeshed in trivial detail; they must perforce attend to overall significance. In this way the task was set up so as to minimise their handicap.
- p.49 (20) This is of course justified only in a testing situation, i.e. after correct knowledge has been assimilated. To use it before this, i.e. in a teaching situation, is gratuitously to introduce the child to error, with the grave risk of confusing him.
- p.50 (21) Empirical evidence in support of this claim is provided by an experiment in Clydebank itself, where such an enquiry was set up and children inexperienced in constructing a narrative - even those practised in handling sources - proved quite incapable of linking the particulars they had worked out from the sources into a high-order narrative. This was true even of high ability pupils of 14+.
- p.50 (22) See for example the suggested spiral of the Clydebank enquiry (terminating in world economic and political History) - pp.52-53. The lead questions by this time will have become very wide-ranging.

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